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ABSTRACT 
 
BROOKE FISHER LIU: Playing Politics in the Development and Provision of Disaster 
Information for Hispanics (Under the direction of Patricia Curtin) 
 
This study examines how states and counties communicate disaster information to 
Hispanics. Through 13 interviews with state emergency management communicators and a 
national survey of 435 county emergency management directors, the study benchmarks how 
many channels  states and counties employ to communicate Spanish-language disaster 
information. The study addresses who state emergency management communicators and 
county emergency management directors believe should be responsible for developing and 
providing Spanish-language disaster information. Also, the study explores county emergency 
management directors’ perceptions of how capable various nongovernmental and 
governmental groups are of producing Spanish-language disaster information. Finally, the 
study explores whether principal-agent theory helps explain the variety of channels states and 
counties employ to communicate Spanish-language disaster information. 
 The interviews revealed that most of the state emergency management communicators do 
not provide Spanish-language disaster information. Communicators that do provide Spanish-
language disaster information do so mostly through working with groups (e.g., Catholic 
Church, American Red Cross, and local government officials) to develop this information. 
The interviews also revealed that communicators think counties primarily are responsible for 
developing and providing Spanish-language disaster information.
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 The survey found that most of the counties communicate Spanish-language disaster 
information through at least one channel, but counties communicate English-language 
disaster information through three times more channels. Also, contrary to what state 
communicators believe, county emergency management directors believe the federal 
emergency management agency (FEMA) and states primarily are responsible for developing 
and providing Spanish-language disaster information. County directors also believe FEMA 
and the states are most capable of developing Spanish-language disaster information. These 
findings provide evidence that goal conflict (one of the key constructs of principal-agent 
theory) exists between the states and counties.  
 Also, the survey found that one of the most important factors that affects the variety of 
channels county emergency management directors employ to communicate Spanish-language 
disaster information is how often the directors work with groups such as FEMA, state 
emergency management agencies, and nongovernmental groups. Like state communicators, 
county directors work with a diverse set of groups. Thus, no single group emerges as a leader 
in producing and providing Spanish-language disaster information. Also, there is no clear 
channel through which states and counties communicate about how best to produce and 
provide Spanish-language disaster information, providing evidence of information 
asymmetry (the other key construct of principal-agent theory). 
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Chapter I: Introduction and Literature Review 
When Hurricane Katrina landed in southern Mississippi in August 2005, thousands of 
Hispanics did not know the storm was coming until a few hours before Katrina made landfall. 
There were no Spanish-language media in the area, but the city of Hattiesburg passed out  
Spanish-language flyers in a few apartment complexes with large Hispanic populations the 
Sunday before Katrina hit. Away from the city, however, warnings only came word of mouth 
and too late (Schaper, 2005). 
 In October 2002, fear permeated the Washington, DC area when two snipers randomly 
assassinated people. Police Chief Charles Moose made a special plea to Hispanic immigrants 
who may have witnessed shootings on their way to work to come forward. The day before 
making this plea, police arrested and deported two Hispanic undocumented workers who 
stumbled across a police stakeout for the sniper (Clines & Drew, 2003). 
 During Hurricane Isabel in 2003, North Carolina Governor Mike Easley placed priority on 
the restoration of power to Spanish-language radio stations. This order was in direct response 
to the death of at least two Hispanics who were not able to understand English-only crisis 
warnings during the winter ice storm earlier in the year (Headrick, 2003).  
 These examples illustrate the importance of effective crisis communication developed for 
Hispanics. In the first, thousands of Hispanics were unaware of the impending arrival of 
Hurricane Katrina, the nation’s worst natural disaster to date. In the second, police hindered 
their investigation by sending inconsistent messages to Hispanics. In the third, North 
2Carolina first failed to communicate properly during a crisis with Hispanics who speak only 
Spanish, but subsequently improved its crisis communication with these Hispanics. 
 This dissertation examines how, if at all, state emergency management agencies (SEMAs) 
and county emergency management directors incorporate Hispanics into their crisis 
communication before, during, and after disasters. Questions I explore are: Do states and 
counties develop preparation, response, and recovery materials in Spanish (e.g., brochures, 
fact sheets, and public service announcements)? If so, what kinds of materials do they 
develop? How and at what governmental level are these items developed (local level, state 
level, and/or national level)? And, I examine whether theory can help explain when and how 
local governments develop crisis communication for Hispanics.  
 I selected state and county governments as opposed to the national government as my unit 
of analysis because, under the 1989 Stafford Act and the 2005 Interim Federal Response Plan, 
state and county governments are charged with the immediate response to large-scale 
disasters and, even after national assistance arrives, states are responsible for coordinating the 
inter-governmental response. I chose emergency management agencies because they are the 
agencies most involved in crisis preparation and response and thus most involved in crisis 
communication. They also are the agencies that receive funding from the national 
government to prepare for and respond to crises.  
 There are several important reasons for researching whether SEMA communicators and 
county emergency management directors incorporate Hispanics into their crisis 
communication. First, Hispanics are the quickest growing minority population in the United 
States. In 2000, 12% of the U.S. population was Hispanic, but by 2010, the government 
predicts 24% of the U.S. population will be Hispanic (National Association for 
3Multiethnicity, 2004). Increasingly, states and counties must consider the unique needs of 
Hispanics during routine and nonroutine events. It is especially important to consider these 
unique needs during crises given that most Hispanic immigrants are not familiar with the U.S. 
disaster system and thus may not be aware of the resources governments, nonprofits, and 
private organizations provide. Yet historically states and counties are unprepared to 
communicate effectively with Hispanics during disasters (Bolin & Bolton, 1986; Bolin & 
Stanford, 1999; Peacock & Girard, 1998; Perry & Green, 1982; Perry & Mushkatel, 1986; 
Yelvington, 1998).  Also, a large body of research examines other vulnerable populations 
such as the elderly, children, and families (e.g., Rosenfeld, Caye, Ayalon, & Lahad, 2005), 
but very little research examines Hispanics. Thus, my dissertation not only fills a sizeable 
gap in the literature but also provides a benchmark of how, if at all, SEMA communicators 
and county emergency management directors incorporate Hispanics into their crisis 
communication, which is of interest and use for academics and practitioners alike. Further, 
my dissertation builds on crisis communication theory by applying a political science theory, 
principal-agent theory, to analyze crisis communication. 
 I began my studies in this area by conducting semi-structured telephone interviews with 
SEMA communicators during March and April 2005. The sample for the interviews came 
from the top 10 states with the quickest growing Hispanic populations and the top 10 states 
with the largest Hispanic populations according to the Spring 2005 Census figures, for a total 
of 19 states in the sample (one state, Nevada, falls into both categories). The titles of my 
interview subjects varied by state, including public information officer, director of 
communication, and director of public information. In states that had multiple employees 
charged with public communication, I interviewed the highest ranking employee. I contacted 
4the top emergency management communication employee from all 19 states up to five times, 
and obtained 13 completed interviews. 
 For the second portion of the study, I followed up on the interview data by conducting a 
survey of county emergency management directors from across the county. I selected 
counties as the population because all of the SEMA communicators I interviewed 
emphasized counties are responsible for communicating with special-needs populations, 
including Hispanics. The survey sample was all of the counties within the top 10 states with 
the largest Hispanic populations and the top 10 states with the quickest growing Hispanic 
populations as identified by the latest Census data. The purpose of the survey was to 
understand whether and how counties develop Spanish-language disaster information as well 
as document what channels local governments employ to communicate disaster information 
in English and Spanish. The survey also tested the applicability of principal-agent theory for 
research on public sector crisis communication.  
 I chose the term Hispanics rather than Latinos to denote people who identify themselves 
with Mexico, Central American, and/or Latin America and/or speak Spanish. As Green 
(1995) explains, there are limitations to both terms. The term Hispanic was created by the 
U.S. government’s Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in 1978 for census takers who 
needed a term for whites and others who claimed some degree of Spanish-language or 
cultural affiliation. In 1997, the OMB decided that Hispanic and Latino are interchangeable, 
and in 2003 the U.S. Census Bureau began treating race and Hispanic origin as two separate 
and distinct variables.  
 The term Latino has the advantage of both linguistic and geographic association, but omits 
Latin Americans who do not speak Spanish (Green, 1995). The term Latino also is culturally 
5and racially neutral, whereas the term Hispanic refers to individuals who can trace their roots 
back to Spain (Marin & Marin, 1991). Perhaps the best solution to this vernacular dilemma is 
to employ the term used by those who are being researched (Marin & Marin, 1991). Indeed, 
many of the studies on disasters and minorities use Mexican-American instead of Latino or
Hispanic because the primary subjects for those studies are individuals from Mexico. The 
primary subjects for my dissertation are government employees. Thus, I selected Hispanic 
because this is the term my research population most frequently uses. Nevertheless, I 
recognize that race and ethnic labels vary over time and are social constructions rather than 
reflections of reality (Omi, 1999). Likewise, minority groups differ among themselves and 
are not homogenous (Perry, 1987).  
 The remaining portion of this chapter presents the literature on the differences between the 
public and private sectors and the literature on Hispanics and disasters. The next chapter 
reviews current crisis communication theories and explains why I took an inductive theory 
approach to the dissertation. This chapter also discusses why I selected interviews and a 
survey as the methods for my data collections. The second chapter presents the interview 
findings. The third chapter discusses the findings from the survey, relating these quantitative 
findings to the qualitative findings from the interviews. The last chapter discusses the 
implications of the dissertation research for public relations scholars and public sector 
emergency managers.  
 
Literature Review 
 This section reviews two bodies of literature: (a) literature that differentiates the public and 
private sector environments, and (b) literature on Hispanics and disasters. It is necessary to 
6review the public sector literature because the majority of crisis communication research that 
examines public sector crises often assumes public and private organizations respond 
similarly to crises. Public and private organizations, however, operate in very different 
environments, resulting in unique crisis planning and response considerations for each 
environment. 
 Although there is a limited amount of research on Hispanics and crises, it is necessary to 
review this literature to situate my dissertation within this research stream. Also, the review 
of the literature on Hispanics and crises bolsters the argument that much more research needs 
to be conducted in this area, especially on public sector planning for the unique crisis 
communication needs of Hispanics. 
 
Understanding the public sector environment  
 
Most of the literature on crisis communication focuses on the private rather than the public 
sector (Fisher & Horsley, 2005; Garnett, 1992; Garnett & Kouzmin, 1997; Graber, 2003; 
Horsley & Barker, 2002). Although both sectors share some common attributes, to 
paraphrase public administration scholar Graham T. Allison (2004), they are alike in all 
unimportant respects. Thus, it is important to understand how the two environments differ to 
understand how crisis communication practiced in the public sector faces unique 
opportunities and constraints compared to crisis communication practiced in private sector.  
 The most basic difference between the public and private sectors is that government 
agencies are not subject to market pressures or preoccupied with surviving as are business 
groups (Allison, 2004; Appleby, 1973; Avery, Brucchi, & Keane, 1996; Graber, 2003; 
Kirschenbaum, 2004). Government agencies do not have to worry as much about competition 
or generating a profit. Instead, government agencies primarily are concerned with the social 
7purpose of their work (Avery et al., 1996; Rainey, 2003). On one hand, the lack of market 
pressure allows government agencies to provide important services that the market may not 
deem necessary, such as Spanish-language crisis information in a state like North Carolina 
with a Hispanic population of about 8%. On the other hand, the lack of a free market in 
government operations may encourage the government to be inefficient with its resources, 
such as not evaluating crisis communication efforts. The lack of a free market also may 
impede evaluation efforts provided by market indicators such as prices and profits (Allison, 
2004). 
 While market pressures predominately do not guide government actions, regulatory 
control does affect government behavior (Viteritti, 1997). This control imposes more 
constraints on procedures and spheres of operations, resulting in more external sources of 
formal influence and greater fragmentation of these sources (Allison, 2004). For example, the 
national Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1988 and the 
Interim Federal Response Plan of 2003 both clearly outline the steps states have to take to 
secure national support for a crisis or disaster response. These two federal guidelines 
mandate that before the national government can supply emergency relief, state governors 
must formally request the president to declare a state of disaster. In turn, the president must 
receive a recommendation from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
before declaring a state of disaster. If the governor does not formally request aid, FEMA will 
not take action. Likewise, FEMA will not take action unless requested to do so by the 
president. Thus, the public sector lacks the flexibility for improvisation that exists in the 
private sector, and formal regulations guide who takes action and how this action is 
processed. 
8Another strong element that controls government behavior is politics (Allison, 2004; 
Appleby, 1973; Bolin & 't Hart, 2003; Falcione & Downs, 1997; Garnett, 1997; Horsley & 
Barker, 2002). As Appleby (1973) writes, “other institutions, admittedly, are not free from 
politics, but government is politics” (p. 25). Politics may restrict creativity and innovation 
because elected officials do not want to appear too far out of the mainstream (Horsley & 
Barker, 2002). Politics also introduces greater diversity in influences outside of government, 
such as public interest groups, and a greater need for support from the people (Allison, 2004; 
Graber, 2003). In fact, crises are often viewed as the ultimate political events, where 
politicians either become heroes or villains (Bolin & 't Hart, 2003; O’Brien, 1991; Rosenthal 
& Kouzmin, 1997). For example, scholars note the national government’s delayed and 
uncoordinated response to 1992 Hurricane Andrew in Florida significantly contributed to 
former President G. H. Bush’s failed 1992 re-election campaign (Peacock & Ragsdale, 1998). 
Conversely, former New York mayor Giuliani’s highly acclaimed response to the September 
11, 2001 terrorist attacks made him an international hero (Cohen, Eimicke, & Horan, 2002).  
 Related to politics is the fact that the government is of interest to everyone and thus is 
obliged to communicate with everyone (Appleby, 1973; Viteretti, 1997). Also, government 
audiences are more diverse and demanding than corporate audiences (Allison, 2004; Garnett, 
1992, 1997; Graber, 2003). As a result, the public has high expectations for government 
performance and carefully scrutinizes its performance. For example, on any given issue the 
government is expected to respond to publics from all three levels of government, lobbyists, 
public interest groups, and citizens from all age groups and socioeconomic classes. All of 
these publics have different needs and expect the government to respond to these needs.  
9The media also highly scrutinize the government, resulting in what Wamsley and 
Schroeder (1996) call the “CNN syndrome” (p. 236) and Garnett (1992) calls 
“communicating in a fishbowl” (p. 7). The government is never free from 24/7 news 
coverage, resulting in a tendency to follow the status quo and improvise less (Garnett, 1997; 
Graber, 2003; Hiebert, 1981; Schneider, 1995). The media, however, also are dependent 
upon the government as an important source of information (Cutlip, 1981; Graber, 2003; 
Hiebert, 1981). Under the Freedom of Information Act, the public and the media have the 
right to know what the government is doing. This transparent environment may contribute to 
a tendency to maintain the status quo and slow down decision-making (Graber, 2003).  
 Public sector communicators cannot operate on their own because they are part of a 
federalist government that is guided by intergovernmental relations. Federalism is “a system 
of authority constitutionally apportioned between central and regional governments” 
(O’Toole, 2000, p. 2). This system of federalism decentralizes authority among multiple 
players resulting in less decision-making autonomy and greater use of formal regulations 
(Allison, 2004; Graber, 2003). 
 Key to understanding the United States federalist government is understanding the role of 
intergovernmental relations, which is “the subject of how our many and varied American 
governments deal with each other and what their relative, roles, responsibilities, and levels of 
influence are and should be” (O’Toole, 2000, p. 2). Thus, federalism in the U.S. does not 
mean the various levels of government operate on their own; rather, these levels are required 
to interact in order to fulfill their responsibilities. Intergovernmental relations means that 
within each level of government, numerous individual variations exist. Perhaps the best way 
to understand the effect of federalism and intergovernmental relations on the U.S. 
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government is through Godzins’ (2000) analogy of the American government as a marble 
cake in which all three levels (national, state, and local) intertwine and all government action 
involves multiple players with diverse political beliefs and policy agendas.    
 In the context of crises, federalism and intergovernmental relations mean that multiple 
layers of the government as well as multiple agencies must coordinate during the planning, 
response, and recover phases of disasters. Each state has an emergency management agency 
that operates independently of FEMA. The national government mainly supplies funding, the 
state government primarily serves as the grantee of national funds and director of the crisis 
response, and the county and municipal governments provide ground support in the form of 
policemen, firemen, and others (Schneider, 1995; Sylves, 1994). The state government must 
also coordinate with private sector service providers such as energy companies and nonprofit 
organizations like the American Red Cross. Thus, crisis communication and management in 
the public sector involves many more players than in the private sector.  
 Finally, organizational performance and employee characteristics in the public sector 
differ from those in the private sector. In government, top management more frequently turns 
over because of the election cycle (Allison, 2004; Garnett, 1997; Graber, 2003). Top 
management has less authority in the public sector because of federalism and 
intergovernmental relations (Allison, 2004; Graber, 2003). Government employees also tend 
to be less committed to their employers than do corporate employees because of the lack of 
financial incentives, inefficiency, and frequent turnover of management in the government 
(Allison, 2004; Graber, 2003). Thus, policy development in the public sector may be 
disjointed and change frequently.  
11 
 Despite all of these differences between the public and private sectors, the two 
environments naturally share some common characteristics and goals. During a crisis, both 
public and private organizations partner to respond more effectively. For example, after 2005 
Hurricane Katrina, Progress Energy restored power to the Gulf region, FEMA provided long-
term financial assistance, Louisiana and Mississippi provided immediate food and aid, and 
the American Red Cross provided shelter. For this reason, some scholars advocate that 
researchers examine the two sectors together rather than as separate groups (McEntire, 2004; 
Rainey, 2003). Others note researchers need to consider the blurred lines between public and 
private sector emergency management (McEntire, 2004; Schneider, 2004).  
 Rainey (2003) suggests a continuum exists rather than a clear dichotomy between the 
sectors, which ranges from a pure government agency to a private business with various 
hybrids in between, such as electric utility companies, which are private organizations 
heavily regulated by the government. The typology considers ownership, sources of funding, 
and method of control. According to Rainey’s typology, a state agency would be purely 
public. Government-sponsored enterprises like corporations for public broadcasting and 
government contractors would fall in the middle. And, private enterprises, such as a public 
relations agency, would be purely private. This dissertation examines state and county 
emergency management agencies, which are purely public. It is important, however, to 
recognize that even such purely public groups interact with other quasi-public groups, such 
as the American Red Cross, and private groups, such as consulting companies, to 
communicate with the public.  
 In sum, the public sector environment provides opportunities and constraints that affect 
how the government communicates. First, the government predominately is not subject to 
12 
market pressures, potentially leading to inefficiency. Second, regulatory control severely 
restricts options available for action at each level of government. Third, politics exert a 
strong influence over behavior, sometimes restricting creativity and innovation. Fourth, the 
government operates in a transparent environment, in which all decisions are scrutinized by 
the media and the public. Fifth, the system of federalism and intergovernmental relations 
ensures that decisions are made by multiple, diverse groups rather than by a single entity or 
person, complicating decision making. Finally, organizational performance and employee 
characteristics are different in the public sector, which influence the development of policy. 
All of these opportunities and constraints shape the way in which the government 
communicates during routine times and non-routine times such as crises. Likewise, the way 
in which the government communicates during crises is affected by its partnerships with 
other public entitles, quasi-public groups, and private groups.  
 The literature on the public sector environment highlights the fact that scholars must 
consider the public sector’s unique environmental constraints and opportunities when 
conducting crisis communication research. Likewise, when conducting research on how 
crisis communication affects specific publics, such as Hispanics, scholars must consider 
various factors including the public’s preferred sources of information and reactions to 
warning messages. Of course, more is known about the behavior of certain publics, such as 
children, during disasters. The following section reviews the limited research on how 
Hispanics react to disasters in the United States.   
 
13 
Hispanics and crises  
Very few studies directly discuss how the government prepares for and responds to the 
unique crisis communication needs of Hispanics, but researchers have explored how 
Hispanics differ from Anglos in their responses to disasters. Although this focus is somewhat 
tangential to the topic of this dissertation, understanding how Hispanics differ from Anglos in 
their responses to disasters provides insight into why and how the government should plan 
for the unique crisis communication needs of Hispanics. 
 Most of the research on Hispanics and disasters takes a vulnerability perspective, arguing 
that Hispanics are more susceptible to adverse results from disasters than members of the 
majority population (Perry, Lindell, & Green, 1981). In general, this research can be divided 
into two primary categories: (a) preferred sources of disaster information and the effects of 
these sources on preparation and response, and (b) preferred sources of aid after disasters. A 
third, and smaller, set of studies highlights the importance of considering minorities as 
unique publics during disaster planning. Because most of the research examining Hispanics 
during disasters also examines blacks, the literature review highlights findings for both of 
these minority groups. When possible, I distinguish findings unique to Hispanics. Finally, 
much of the literature on disasters and minorities, unfortunately, displays significant 
methodological flaws, discussed later. Also, most of the research was conducted over 20 
years ago, raising questions whether the same conclusions would be found if the studies were 
conducted today. Despite these limitations, however, the findings from the research on 
Hispanics and disasters unequivocally indicate that the government must develop unique 
crisis communication strategies for Hispanics (and other minorities). 
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 Preferred information sources for disaster warning and response by ethnicity. 
 Research on preferred information sources for disaster warning and response finds several 
differences among Hispanics, blacks, and Anglos. This body of research analyzes the 
importance of social networks, mass media, authorities, and community meetings in 
informing the public about disasters. In a related vein, limited research also examines the 
likelihood whites, Hispanics, and blacks will believe disaster warnings and act accordingly 
(e.g., evacuate when mandated to do so by state government). 
 Several studies conclude Hispanics, and sometimes blacks, are more likely than whites to 
rely on social networks for disaster information (Blanchard-Boehm, 1997; Perry & Lindell, 
1991; Perry, Lindell, & Green, 1982; Perry & Mushkatel, 1986; Turner, Nigg, Paz, & Young, 
1980). Findings, however, are somewhat muddled as to whether these social networks are the 
preferred source of disaster information for Hispanics. For example, during revised 
earthquake predictions in California, Blanchard-Boehm concluded through interviews that all 
of her respondents (white, Hispanic, and black) chose TV news as their primary source of 
information. Hispanics, however, selected radio news and social networks as their secondary 
sources of information, whereas blacks also selected radio news but did not mention social 
networks. Whites did not mention radio news or social networks. Conversely, some 
researchers conclude that radio is the best medium to reach all audiences because all ethnic 
groups identify it as an effective source of disaster information (Perry, Green, & Mushkatel, 
1983).  
 Through extensive interviews conducted in two communities, Perry and Lindell (1991) 
determined Mexican-Americans seem to rely on media more for slow-developing threats and 
social networks for fast-developing threats. Contrary to Blanchard-Boehm’s (1997) findings, 
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Perry and Lindell determined blacks almost always rely on social networks, whereas whites 
typically do not rely on social networks except during slowly developing threats (Perry & 
Lindell, 1991). Through surveying victims after three different disasters (train derailment, 
flood, and nitric acid spill), Perry and Mushkatel (1986) concluded Mexican-Americans are 
more likely to engage their social networks than are whites or blacks. Both whites and 
Mexican-Americans, however, are most likely to engage the media and authorities to confirm 
warnings, whereas blacks are most likely to contact family and friends (Perry & Mushkatel, 
1986).  
 Research on source credibility and disaster information concludes Hispanics also are more 
likely than whites to identify authorities as credible sources for disaster information (Johnson, 
2002; Perry & Lindell, 1991; Turner et al., 1980), but blacks are the most likely to identify 
authorities as credible sources compared to whites and Hispanics (Perry & Lindell, 1991). 
Identification of authorities as credible sources, however, may differ by race and type of 
authority. From a survey of 1,450 residents of Los Angeles County, Turner et al. concluded 
Mexican-Americans are more trusting of government sources than are blacks and whites, but 
whites are more trusting of scientific sources than Mexican-Americans and blacks. Also, 
blacks perceive scientific sources as the least trustworthy. In their study of a train derailment 
and a flood, however, Perry and Lindell determined that when a threat is unfamiliar, all 
citizens, regardless of ethnicity, use social networks. Similarly, examining the literature on 
official warnings and evacuation response, Perry and Green (1982) noted blacks and 
Mexican-Americans more often cite official warnings as a reason for evacuation than do 
whites. Also, Johnson found in a survey that explored responses to air pollution information 
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that blacks and Hispanics were more likely than whites to trust official sources of 
information.  
 Other research indicates Hispanics may treat the media as a more reliable source of 
disaster information than whites and blacks (Blanchard-Boehm, 1997; Perry & Mushkatel, 
1986; Perry & Lindell, 1991). For example, Hispanics often cite two media sources for 
disaster information (TV and radio), whereas whites cite only one source (television); 
(Blanchard-Boehm, 1997). Hispanics also rely more on the media for disaster information, 
especially Spanish-language media, than both whites and blacks (Perry & Mushkatel, 1986). 
Some research, however, notes that, in general, whites rely on mass media as a credible 
source for disaster information more than Mexican-Americans and blacks (Perry & Lindell, 
1991), and blacks rely the least on media compared with Mexican-Americans and whites 
(Turner et al., 1980).  
 One possible explanation for the discrepancies in these findings is Hispanics may seek 
disaster information only from Spanish-language media. Several studies cite a lack of 
mediated information available in Spanish, indicating that the same information often is not 
provided in Spanish and English during disasters (Bolton, Liebow, & Olson, 1993; Moore, 
Daniel,  Linnan, Campbell, Benedict, & Meier, 2004; Phillips, 1993). If the media do not 
provide information in Spanish, then Hispanics naturally are less likely to cite the media as 
an important source of disaster information. Another possible explanation for the 
discrepancies is Hispanics treat the media as a more reliable source of disaster information 
when spokespeople in the media are also Hispanic (Arpan, 2002; Perry & Mushkatel, 1986). 
Thus, perhaps when mediated information is available in Spanish and/or spokespeople in the 
media are Hispanic, citizens who identify with Latino culture are more likely to treat this 
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information as more credible. This conclusion, however, needs to be validated through future 
research. 
 A third information source for disaster information preferred by Hispanics and blacks 
compared to whites is community meetings. Perry and Mushkatel (1986) concluded both 
blacks and Hispanics rate community meetings as more desirable sources of disaster 
information compared to whites. This finding makes sense considering other research 
determined Hispanics and blacks are more likely than whites to use social networks 
(Blanchard-Boehm, 1997; Perry & Green, 1982; Perry & Lindell, 1991; Perry & Mushkatel, 
1986), indicating personal as opposed to mediated contacts are important for Hispanics and 
blacks. Since a recent trend in disaster research is to examine community preparedness and 
understanding of potential hazards (Kirschenbaum, 2004; Lindell & Perry, 2004; Tierney, 
Lindell, & Perry, 2001), more research on community meetings and their role in transmitting 
disaster information among various ethnic/racial groups may be forthcoming. 
 Finally, regardless of the source of disaster information, several studies observe Hispanics 
and blacks are less likely than whites to evacuate prior to disasters (Gladwin & Peacock, 
1998; Perry & Green, 1982; Perry et al., 1982, Turner et al., 1980) and less likely than whites 
to prepare for disasters (Blanchard-Boehm, 1997; Perry et al., 1982; Turner et al., 1980). In a 
qualitative study of revised earthquake predictions in Southern California, Blanchard-Boehm 
found Hispanics and blacks were less likely than whites to make structural improvements to 
their homes as a preparation for future earthquakes. Reasons for not making these structural 
changes, however, varied between Hispanics and blacks. Hispanics were most likely to say 
they never got around to the repairs and blacks were most likely to say they could not afford 
the repairs (Blanchard-Boehm, 1997). Perry et al. concluded through survey research 
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Mexican-Americans interpreted the same messages as indicating lower levels of personal 
danger than whites did and did not plan as much for disasters. Also, Mexican-Americans 
were more skeptical of warning messages than whites were regardless of the source of the 
message (Perry et al., 1982). This study did not include blacks. 
 Explanations for these findings that Hispanics and blacks are less likely to evacuate 
include the following: Hispanics and blacks are more likely to have extended families who 
live with them, and thus it is harder to mobilize large groups of people and evacuate 
(Gladwin & Peacock, 1998); Hispanics and blacks are more likely to have elderly heads-of-
households who cannot evacuate, resulting in the entire family not evacuating (Gladwin & 
Peacock, 1998); Hispanics and blacks have fewer financial resources than whites, and thus 
are less capable of evacuation (Gladwin & Peacock, 1998; Perry & Green, 1982); Hispanics 
are less likely to follow recommendations from evacuation warnings (Turner et al., 1980); 
and Hispanics are more skeptical of warning messages (Perry et al., 1982). Another 
explanation may be that Hispanic and black cultures tend to be more fatalistic than white 
culture (Green, 1995; Turner et al., 1980). Thus, Hispanics and blacks may believe disasters 
are unavoidable and consequently may be less likely to respond to warning and evacuation 
messages. Since the data on preferred information sources by ethnicity produce mixed results, 
Perry and Nelson (1991) advise sending disaster information, including evacuation 
recommendations, through multiple channels over time. 
 In sum, Hispanics, and sometimes blacks, are more likely than whites are to rely on social 
networks for disaster information. Hispanics also rely on broadcast media and community 
meetings as important sources of disaster information. Hispanics are more likely than whites 
are to identify authorities as credible sources for disaster information and to treat the media 
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as a reliable source. Finally, regardless of the source of disaster information, Hispanics are 
less likely than whites are to evacuate prior to disasters. 
 
Sources of aid and recovery outcomes.  
 From reviewing the literature, it is clear that sources of disaster-relief aid differ for blacks, 
Hispanics, and whites. Further, Hispanics and blacks are reluctant to seek aid, and both 
Hispanics and blacks are more likely than whites are to receive insufficient insurance 
settlements. When Hispanics do seek aid, they are more likely than whites or blacks to seek it 
from a church or nonprofit source than from a government source. 
 Several studies conclude Hispanics are less likely to seek disaster-relief aid than both 
blacks and whites (Bolin & Stanford, 1998, 1999; Bolton et al., 1993; Yelvington, 1998). 
One possible explanation for this phenomenon is that Hispanics who do not hold citizenship 
fear deportation. After the 1987 Whittier Narrow earthquake, many Hispanics did not seek 
government aid because they were seeking legal immigration status; under the INS amnesty 
program at that time, applicants could not receive public assistance while in the United States 
without documentation (Bolton et al., 1993). It took the federal government almost two 
weeks to waive this requirement (Bolton et al., 1993). After the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake, 
many minority survivors did not go to disaster assistance centers for fear of deportation 
(Bolin & Stanford, 1990). Similarly, after Hurricane Andrew in 1992, many Hispanics did 
not seek government-provided temporary shelter for fear of deportation (Yelvington, 1998).  
 Another explanation is that Hispanics do not expect as much from the government as 
blacks and whites do because they did not receive aid in their home countries during similar 
disasters. After the 1994 Northridge Earthquake, recent Mexican immigrants were reluctant 
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to pursue disaster assistance to which they were legally entitled because they were not 
accustomed to the government giving aid after disasters (Bolin & Stanford, 1999). These 
immigrants even tried to repay the American Red Cross with FEMA checks for blankets and 
food items given to them during the early days of recovery (Bolin & Stanford, 1999). 
 Both Hispanics and blacks are more likely than whites to receive insufficient insurance 
settlements after disasters (Bolin & Bolton, 1986; Peacock & Girard 1998). In a comparison 
of the effects of three natural disasters (tornado, flood, and earthquake), Bolin and Bolton 
concluded possession of insurance was directly related to ethnicity and socioeconomic status. 
The researchers found that both black and Hispanic disaster survivors tended to be of lower 
socioeconomic status than white disaster survivors and subsequently blacks and Hispanics 
were less likely to possess sufficient insurance. Likewise, after conducting more than 400 
interviews with white and black survivors of a Texas tornado, Bolin and Klenow (1988) 
concluded a significantly higher proportion of white elderly had recovered eight months after 
the tornado compared to black elderly. The researchers determined socio-economic status 
affected psychological recovery across all races. Also, family size had a positive effect on 
black elderly recovery, but not on white elderly recovery (Bolin & Klenow, 1988). 
 In sum, Hispanics are less likely to seek disaster-relief aid than both blacks and whites. 
Explanations for this findings are: Hispanics are not accustomed to receiving disaster aid and 
Hispanics fear deportation if they seek disaster aid. Also, both Hispanics and blacks are more 
likely than whites to receive insufficient insurance settlements after disasters. Researchers do 
not provide explanations for this finding other than Hispanics and black are more likely to be 
members of lower socio-economic classes.  
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 Emergency planning and blacks and Hispanics. 
 Unfortunately, minimal empirical research examines emergency planning and minorities. 
A few researchers report Hispanics are dissatisfied with the lack of Spanish-language 
information available via the media during disasters (Bolton et al., 1993; Moore et al., 2004) 
and the lack of bilingual government employees available after disasters (Phillips, 1993). 
Also, one study found having an emergency plan was positively correlated with evacuation 
compliance among blacks and whites, but not among Mexican-Americans (Perry & Green, 
1982). Many more researchers highlight the results of poor government planning and 
interactions with Hispanics after disasters (Bolin & Bolton; 1986; Bolton et al., 1993; Bolin 
& Stanford, 1998, 1999; Philips, 1993; Yelvington, 1998).  
 The 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake in California serves as a perfect case study of what can 
go wrong when Hispanics are not considered in emergency planning. After the earthquake, 
aid information was insufficiently available in Spanish and the government had very few 
bilingual workers (Philips, 1993). Also, as a result of poor planning, Hispanics became sick 
from eating the Anglo food provided by disaster relief workers. And many Mexican-
Americans refused to go to American Red Cross shelters because they were afraid of 
damaging aftershocks, which had occurred after the 1985 Mexico City earthquake (Phillips, 
1993). Even more disconcertning, many homeless Central American families refused to stay 
in the tents provided by the American Red Cross, which served as temporary housing units. 
These tents reminded many of these refugees of the government-supported death camps in 
their home countries (Bolin & Stanford, 1990).  
 Unfortunately, the Loma Prieta earthquake is not the only case study in poor emergency 
management planning for Hispanics’ unique needs. After the 1987 Whittier Narrow 
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earthquake in California, Hispanics reported during interviews that English-language stations 
offered more useful information than Spanish-language stations (Bolton et al., 1993). As 
already discussed, many Hispanics did not go to the shelters because of their previous 
experience with aftershocks from their home countries (Rubin & Palm, 1987). Also after the 
Whittier Narrow earthquake, many Hispanics did not seek government assistance because, 
under the then-operating INS amnesty program, they could not receive government 
assistance (Bolton et al., 1993).  
 In addition, after the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake, Hispanic victims charged the 
American Red Cross with racism and discrimination, and 20 citizen groups filed complaints 
against FEMA for what they perceived as systematic discrimination against low-income, 
non-English speaking victims (Bolin & Stanford, 1990). Both the American Red Cross and 
FEMA denied these charges, and the suit was later dropped. During 1992 Hurricane Andrew, 
most of the early hurricane-relief information was provided only in English (Yelvington, 
1998). After Hurricane Andrew, border patrol officers had to be told not to wear their 
uniforms while serving food to tent-city occupants, most of whom were Hispanic 
(Yelvington, 1998).  
 In sum, limited research has been conducted on emergency planning and Hispanics. 
Numerous case studies, however, highlight the importance of considering Hispanics 
separately from the native English-speaking population when planning for effective 
emergency management responses. 
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 Limitations of disaster research on Hispanics. 
 Although the research on Hispanics and disasters provides several meaningful insights, the 
research also possesses several severe limitations. Most obviously, there is not a lot of 
research on this topic. And, the limited research that exists often groups blacks and Hispanics 
together as minorities. There no doubt are similarities between Hispanics’ and blacks’ 
experiences during disasters, but these similarities are most likely due to similar socio-
economic status rather than status as an ethnic/racial minority. More research needs to be 
conducted that specifically examines Hispanics rather than grouping Hispanics with blacks. 
Although many researchers identify Hispanics by subgroup (e.g., Mexican-Americans), some 
researchers need to be careful about grouping all Hispanics together as one uniform minority. 
In addition, researchers need to consider the different legal status of Hispanics in the United 
States, specifically how illegal status affects how Hispanics respond to crisis communication. 
 Most of the limited research on disasters and Hispanics was conducted in the early 1980s 
to late 1990s. During this time frame, many large disasters occurred, most notably Hurricane 
Andrew, the Whittier Narrow earthquake, and the Loma Prieta earthquake. These disasters 
provided excellent fodder for this research area, and the findings from these studies may still 
be valid today. Much, however, has changed in the United States since this time frame, 
including INS policies, proliferation of Spanish-language media, size of the U.S. Hispanic 
population, and awareness of the unique needs of Hispanics by emergency managers at all 
levels of government. Thus, if the same studies were conducted today, they might yield very 
different findings.  
 Another limitation is much of the research on Hispanics and disasters is methodologically 
flawed. Some demographic variables are interconnected, such as socioeconomic status and 
24 
ethnicity, but many researchers do not separate these variables in their analyses. 
Consequently, effects are difficult to separate in most disaster response studies (Lindell & 
Perry, 2004). Similarly, it is highly likely that ethnicity exerts influence on disaster behaviors 
via indirect or interactive effects with other variables, such as socioeconomic status, 
perceptions of credibility of authorities, and locus of control (Tierney et al., 2001). Also, 
responses to disasters may vary among ethnic groups depending on the type of disaster (Perry 
& Lindell, 1991, Rosenfeld et al., 2005), but most researchers group all Hispanics with 
blacks regardless of the disaster type being studied. To understand better how Hispanics 
differ from other publics, future research needs to consider multiple variables rather than just 
race/ethnicity and disaster preparation/response. Future research also needs to research 
Hispanics as a separate and diverse ethnic group. 
 Almost all of the research on Hispanics and disasters examines climatological and 
geophysical hazards (Fothergill, Maestas, & Darlington, 1999). Hurricanes, tornados, floods, 
and earthquakes are prime case studies for determining how disasters affect Hispanics 
differently from other publics. Other disasters, such as terrorism, however, also are important 
to study. Quarantelli notes (1999) future disasters will be diffuse and complex (e.g., 
computer failures), and researchers and the government alike need to move beyond the study 
of only climatological and geophysical disasters. Indeed, given the current hyper-awareness 
of terrorism in the United States, research on how Hispanics view and react to these threats 
compared to whites may be particularly relevant and informative. As hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita recently reminded us, however, preparation for terrorism cannot replace preparation for 
natural disasters. Katrina and Rita also reminded us that disasters continue to 
disproportionally affect special-needs publics. 
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 Lastly, and most significant for this dissertation, the vast majority of the literature on 
Hispanics and disasters focuses on post-disaster response rather than the planning and 
preparation phases of disasters (Tierney, Lindell, & Perry, 2001). Similarly, most studies 
focus on the victims of disasters rather than on the decision-makers. When I reviewed the 
literature I did not uncover a single study that focuses on government emergency 
management planning and response regarding Hispanics. More research needs to be 
conducted on how Hispanics plan and prepare for disasters and, specifically, on how the 
government interacts with Hispanic community members to plan and prepare for disasters.  
 
Summary: What we know and need to know about Hispanics and disasters. 
 As evidenced by the numerous limitations to research on disasters and Hispanics, much 
still needs to be learned about how Hispanics differ from other publics in their behaviors 
before, during, and after disasters. Researchers conclude sources of disaster information 
differ for Hispanics, preferred sources of disaster-relief aid differ for Hispanics, and 
emergency planners do not often consider Hispanics. Within each of these conclusions, 
however, there is dissent as to how exactly Hispanics differ from other publics, with the 
exception that researchers clearly have identified unique behaviors of Hispanics related to 
seeking disaster-relief aid. As discussed, much of the research combines Hispanics with 
blacks, further hampering clear conclusions about the unique crisis communication needs of 
Hispanics. The one absolute conclusion is Hispanics do differ from blacks and whites. More 
research is needed to more concretely determine how Hispanics differ. Also, very little 
research investigates how the government plans for and responds to the unique crisis 
communication needs of Hispanics. Thus, my dissertation will address this second hole in the 
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literature by providing a baseline of how, if at all, SEMA communicators and county 
emergency management directors plan for and responding to Hispanics as a public with 
unique communication needs. 
 The next chapter reviews crisis communication theories and explains why I took an 
inductive theory approach to the dissertation. This chapter also outlines how I collected and 
analyzed the interview and survey data.
Chapter II: Research Methods, Research Phase One, and Emergency Theory 
 In this chapter, I first explore existing crisis communication theories, noting why none of 
these theories is appropriate for research on public sector crisis communication developed for 
Hispanics. Second, I explain the inductive theory approach applied to the first stage of the 
dissertation: the interviews with SEMA communicators. Third, I discuss the rationale, 
approach, sampling procedures, and data analysis techniques for the interviews. Fourth, I 
present and explain how the interview findings support the application of principal-agent 
theory to the development of the research questions and hypotheses for the survey. Last, I 
discuss the rationale, approach, sampling procedures, and data analysis techniques for the 
second phase of the research, the survey.  
 
Crisis communication theories 
 Many scholars believe the crisis communication literature largely lacks theoretical 
grounding, is disjointed, and needs further development (Quarentelli, 1999; McEntire, 2004). 
Much of it consists of case studies, which often develop models rather than apply theories 
(e.g., Horsley & Barker, 2002; Marra, 1998). Many of these case studies, however, provide 
no theoretical foundation at all (e.g., Kauffman, 1997, 2000, 2001; Mason, 2004; Wise, 2003, 
2004). Sociology scholar Quarentelli (1999) describes the field of crisis and disaster research 
as “putting the elephant together, blowing soap bubbles, and having singular insights” in his 
seminal book on the disaster studies (p. 234). In other words, there is much room for growth 
in the development of crisis communication theory.  
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 One explanation for why the field lacks theoretical grounding is that the field is highly 
applied. Researchers note studies typically focus on a specific event rather than on a broader 
theoretical understanding of the root of responses to disasters (Schneider, 2004; Tierney et al., 
2001). Yet, researchers increasingly call for further theoretical development to enhance 
practice (Cwiak, Cline, & KarlgAard, 2004; McEntire, 2004; Schneider, 2004; Quarantelli, 
1999).  
 Through an extensive review of the literature, I identified three frequently applied theories 
for crisis communication research: chaos theory, image repair discourse theory, and 
situational theory of publics.  
 
Chaos theory 
 Chaos theory conceptualizes crises as natural events in the normal life cycle of an 
organization that result from the accumulation of stress or noise in the system (Koehler, 
Kress, & Miller, 2001). Chaos theory highlights that over time small variances, referred to as 
the butterfly effects, can create major changes in organizational systems that initially cannot 
be detected or measured because these changes are so minor (Seeger, 2002). Often, these 
butterfly effects result in crises. Chaos theory advocates for a paradigm shift in crisis 
management by stating all organizations are prone to crises. Thus, rather than training 
employees how to avoid and mitigate crises, organizations may be better served by teaching 
employees how to quickly respond and adapt during crises (Sellnow, Seeger, & Ulmer, 2002). 
Several key terms used by chaos theorists must be reviewed: route, bifurcations, attractors,
scale, and fractals.
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 According to chaos theory, organizations continue on a single route until they reach a 
certain point where they become highly sensitive to initial conditions and may abruptly 
change (Koehler et al., 2001). These abrupt changes are referred to as bifurcations and are 
points at which the system rearranges itself into a new underlying order that may come to 
resemble, or be completely different, from the prior order (Murphy, 1996). Such bifurcation 
points often signal the onset of a crisis. Because of this trend toward destabilization through 
bifurcations, predicting final outcomes beyond the short term becomes impossible (Murphy, 
1996). However, these unpredictable systems still possess a deep structure, referred to as 
attractors, which are organizational principles, inherent shapes or states of affairs to which a 
phenomenon will always tend to return to as it evolves (Murphy, 1996). These attractors 
constrain variance and create an underlying order in a chaotic system (Seeger et al., 2003).  
 Finally, the terms scale and fractal refer to the link between chaos theory and method. 
Scale is the difficulty in perceiving patterns in chaos and the importance of viewing the 
evolutionary history of systems and organizations rather than single points in time (Murphy, 
1996). Because chaos theorists believe quantitative measures lack the necessary precision to 
understand phenomena in complex and chaotic systems, they recommend qualitative inquiry 
to discover more detailed meaning (Sellnow, Seeger, & Ulmer, 2002). Fractals are elaborate 
self-repeating systems and patterns that are products of bifurcations. These fractals are best 
measured through qualitative measures that account for perspective (Seeger, Sellnow, & 
Ulmer, 2003).  
 In sum, chaos theory is valuable for analyzing crises because it emphasizes numerous 
elements that are common to crises: impact of small variance and unpredictability (Seeger, 
2002). Chaos theory, however, provides a general framework for analysis rather than specific 
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predictions because the theory views systems as too complex and dynamic for precision 
(Seeger et al., 2003).  
 Chaos theory is limited by several factors. Perhaps most significantly, the fact that it is so 
general lessens the theory’s ability to provide detailed analyses, especially predictions. Some 
researchers observe that chaos theory is best paired with other theories to mitigate this 
weakness (Seeger, 2002). Another significant limitation of the theory is that it focuses on 
management decisions as sources of chaos. Management skills, however, may not be the 
answer to why response organizations fail or succeed during crises. Sensitivity to initial 
conditions and relationships with other organizations may contribute more to a successful 
response (Kauffman, 1985). Indeed, in the world of public sector management, 
intergovernmental relationships as well as public-private sector relationships are essential to 
effective disaster management. Finally, chaos theory may not be applicable to disaster-
focused agencies and organizations because these groups are primed for chaos and thus may 
be able to better adapt to fractals and bifurcations (Priesmeyer & Cole, 1995).  
Image repair discourse theory  
Benoit (1995) proposes a theory of image repair discourse to understand how 
organizations can respond during crises. The two basic components of image repair discourse 
are that an organization is held responsible for an action by a key public and this action is 
considered offensive. Thus, an organization does not have to be guilty to be considered 
responsible. Further, the theory is based on two assumptions: Communication is a goal-
directed activity, and maintaining a positive reputation is one of the central goals of 
communication. For Benoit, reputation is both context-specific and stakeholder-specific 
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(Fishman, 1999). According to image repair discourse, the primary goal of an organization 
facing a crisis is restoring or protecting its image. Benoit (1995), however, recognizes that 
this may not be the only or even most important goal for an organization. Thus, the theory is 
not intended to capture the phases of a crisis but rather just the rhetoric of the response phase.  
 Benoit (1997) outlines five broad categories of image repair strategies: denial, evasion of 
responsibility, reduction of offensiveness, corrective action, and mortification (i.e., beg for 
forgiveness). These strategies may not always work well together (Benoit & Czerwinski, 
1997). Within these categories, several tactics can be employed. For example, under denial, 
an organization may deny that an act occurred, that the firm performed the act, or that the act 
was harmful to anyone. Alternatively, an organization can shift the blame and argue that 
another organization or person was actually responsible for the offensive act.  
 Benoit (1997) emphasizes that when a crisis occurs organizations must be careful to 
understand the specific nature of the crisis and the audience they need to address before 
implementing a plan. Also, organizations should avoid making false claims and should admit 
fault as soon as possible. Although it is possible at times to shift blame, this strategy cannot 
be viewed as a solution to problems. It is critical to report plans to correct and/or prevent 
recurrence of the problem so that the response is not viewed as empty rhetoric. Additionally, 
minimization cannot always be expected to improve a corporation’s image. Finally, the 
power of persuasion is limited and cannot always be expected to restore an organization’s 
image, especially after a large crisis for which an organization is at fault (e.g., the Exxon 
Valdez spill).  
 Image repair discourse theory provides a powerful structure for analyzing rhetorical 
responses to crises. The theory, however, examines only a single component of a crisis rather 
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than the entire process (Drumheller & Benoit, 2004). The theory, also, only applies to crises 
in which culpability is a key issue. Some crises may not be as likely to involve culpability, 
such as some natural disasters. Since the theory focuses only on the rhetoric of response, it 
will not be useful for this study, which examines the planning and response phases of 
disasters. 
 
Situational theory of publics 
Introduced by James Grunig in 1976, the situational theory of publics hypothesizes that 
communication behavior can be explained by the extent to which an individual recognizes a 
problem, the extent to which an individual’s behavior is limited by constraints, and the extent 
to which an individual is involved in a problem (Grunig, 1977). Developed from Dewey and 
Blumer’s concept of an active public that forms when individuals recognize a problem 
around specific issues produced by organizational behavior (Dozier & Ehling, 1992), the 
theory assumes that people behave consistently when faced with similar situations. The 
theory, however, does not assume that a situation alone can predict people’s behavior, but 
rather people’s perceptions of a situation best predicts how they will communicate about that 
situation. 
 Situational theory proposes three independent variables: problem recognition, constraint 
recognition, and level of involvement. Problem recognition refers to whether people detect a 
problem and think about how they can change the situation. Constraint recognition refers to 
whether people think they can do anything about the problem (Major, 1998). Situational 
theory states that people seldom seek information about situations that do not involve them. 
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Yet, people will randomly process information about low-involvement situations, especially 
if they also recognize the situation as problematic (Grunig, 1989). 
 The theory categorizes audiences into four opinion publics based upon degrees of problem 
recognition and constraint recognition: routine-habit behavior, problem-recognition behavior, 
fatalistic behavior, and constraint behavior. The theory states that whether individuals 
actively or passively seek information about a problem depends upon to which opinion 
public the individuals belong. In routine-habit behavior, an individual communicates 
automatically to receive information that reinforces habitual behavior (Grunig & Stamm, 
1979). In constrained-behavior situations, a person communicates actively until he or she 
realizes that the constraints cannot be changed. Finally, in fatalistic situations people are 
apathetic and rarely communicate about their situations. The theory states it may be more 
difficult to encourage passive audiences to become involved than active audiences (Heath & 
Douglas, 1991). More recent research applying situational theory investigates antecedent 
factors to involvement (Aldoory, 2001), one of the key independent variables, and identified 
a shared dimension of involvement (Aldoory & VanDyke, 2004).  
 Situational theory has several limitations. First, the theory may be best thought of as a 
frame of reference for viewing multiple situations, but this frame must not be viewed as 
entirely consistent from situation to situation over time (Atwood & Major, 1991). Thus, the 
information seeking and processing behaviors of publics may not be consistently predicted 
by the theory. Also, situational theory can predict attitudes and behaviors adopted by publics 
but may not predict memory effects (Cameron, 1992). The theory loses predictive validity if 
publics do not retain learned behaviors from past situations that can be applied to future 
situations. In addition, a critical missing variable in situational theory is the sources 
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individuals use when seeking information (Hamilton, 1992). It is important to know if 
publics prefer the mass media, interpersonal networks, or other sources so that 
communicators can release messages through the most effective channels to target audiences. 
Also, the theory does not consider the valence (negative or positive response) of the publics’ 
problem recognition or involvement, which may affect whether information is retained over 
time (Cameron, 1992; Slater, Chipman, Auld, Keefe, & Kendall, 1992). Finally, the theory 
does not consider the publics’ support for an issue. 
 
Inductive theory approach: Finding crisis theory that fits the public sector 
 A common weakness of the chaos, image repair discourse, and situational theories is that 
none focuses on the overall management of crisis communication. Chaos theory provides a 
conceptual approach to managing crises, but the theory is too broad to develop specific 
research questions and hypotheses. Image repair discourse theory only focuses on one aspect 
of crisis communication management: the response rhetoric. Situational theory of public 
focuses on the audience rather than the management side of crisis communication. Further, 
none of these theories were developed specifically for the public sector, and thus do not 
incorporate unique government environmental characteristics such as providing for the 
greater good, federalism, intergovernmental relations, and frequent management turnover. A 
theory is needed that incorporates all phases of crisis communication management, planning, 
response, and recovery, as well as the unique environmental characteristics of the public 
sector. Because no such inclusive theory could be identified, I took an inductive theory 
approach to the interviews. As defined by Strauss and Corbin (1998), inductive theory is a 
method for systematically gathering and analyzing data (mostly qualitative) to generate 
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theory that explains the data. An inductive approach may produce the foundation for a new 
theory or may lead to the application of an existing theory to explain the data. Based on the 
interview findings, I took the latter approach of applying an existing political science theory, 
principal-agent theory, to explain the interview findings from the first phase of the research.  
 
Interviews 
 I conducted 13 semi-structured interviews with SEMA communicators. The interview data 
provided insights into how and why SEMAs communicate disaster information to the public 
in general, and Hispanics in particular. The interview data also provided additional insights 
into what kind of theory is needed for research on public sector crisis communication.  
 In the next section, I first explain the advantages and disadvantages of qualitative research 
in general and interviews in particular. This explanation illustrates why I began the data 
collection with semi-structured interviews. Then, I describe the sampling procedure for 
selecting the interview participants, outline the interview guide, and explain the data analysis 
procedures. Finally, I summarize the key interview findings, including the data that led to the 
identification of principal-agent theory as an appropriate theoretical lens for my dissertation.  
 
Qualitative research: Advantages and disadvantages 
 There are many reasons for employing qualitative research in general and interviews in 
particular. Qualitative research is ideal for exploring a topic for which little is known (Denzin 
& Lincoln, 2003). By yielding detailed descriptions and observations, called “thick 
description” (Geertz, 1973), qualitative data yield richer findings than much quantitative 
research. In the case of my topic of study, little is known about crisis communication 
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developed for Hispanics, making qualitative inquiry ideal as a first research phase. Another 
attribute of qualitative research is it collects data from the emic perspective (that of the 
research participants). It is important to obtain the emic perspective so that the conclusions 
accurately reflect the population being studied rather than the researcher’s biases and/or 
opinions. The emic perspective especially is important for my dissertation given the dearth of 
academic and applied research on crisis communication and Hispanics.  
 Further, in qualitative research, the researcher is the instrument (Marshall & Rossman, 
1999). This means that the qualitative researcher has more flexibility to adapt to changing 
situations as data are collected. Conversely, in quantitative research, the instrument is pre-
determined before the data are collected and, once determined, there is no flexibility in 
adapting the instrument to better meet the population or issues being examined. For this 
study, flexibility was important because I explored an under-researched topic and did not 
have previous research to help develop the interview questionnaire. Finally, qualitative 
research is ideal for building new theory or finding an appropriate existing theory (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998). Since the review of the literature did not reveal any theories appropriate for 
my study, I took an inductive theory approach to the interviews.  
 
Interviews: Advantages and disadvantages 
The purpose of interviews is to obtain data from the research subjects’ perspectives (Lee, 
1999). There are four commonly employed types of interviews: structured, semi-structured, 
open, and long (Marshall & Rossman, 1999). Structured interviews allow the least amount of 
flexibility, requiring the researcher to use a pre-determined interview script that cannot be 
altered during the interview. Semi-structured interviews allow more flexibility by allowing 
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the researcher to adjust the interview questions based on findings; these interviews, however, 
maintain some structure by requiring the researcher to develop an interview guide with five 
to six questions before conducting interviews. Open interviews are completely unstructured. 
Typically, these interviews begin with the researcher asking one question and from there the 
researcher lets the interview subject guide the interview. Finally, long interviews are a 
combination of semi-structured and open interviews. In long interviews, the researcher has a 
pre-set guide with a few questions, but the research subject also guides the flow of the 
interview. I selected semi-structured interviews for my dissertation because I wanted to 
collect data about a specific topic, crisis communication developed for Hispanics, but also 
wanted to provide the opportunity for my interview subjects to discuss other issues they 
thought relevant.  
 Regardless of the type of interview conducted, the key to a successful interview is 
developing a sound interview guide (McCracken, 1988). The interview guide provides the 
focus for the interview and ensures that the researcher asks the questions in the same order 
for each interview. Similarly, the type of questions asked during an interview is critical to 
obtaining quality data (Lee, 1999; Marshall & Rossman, 1999). All interviews should begin 
with a few introductory questions that are easy to answer and develop rapport between the 
interviewer and interviewee (e.g., Tell me how you came to your current position). Also, 
researchers should probe aggressively to obtain more detailed answers and should not be 
afraid of using silence to encourage participants to elaborate on their answers (Marshall & 
Rossman, 1999). 
 Interviews can be conducted either in-person or over the phone. In-person interviews have 
several advantages. These interviews are likely to generate a higher response rate and fewer 
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early terminations because it is harder for people to say “no” to a researcher in person (Shuy, 
2000). In-person interviews often collect more rich detail because better rapport can be 
developed in face-to-face contacts. Also, in-person interviews are conducted in a naturalistic 
setting, where nonverbal behavior can be observed. (Shuy, 2000). Finally, in-person 
interviews can discuss more sensitive topics because of the rapport that can be generated 
(Shuy, 2000). Telephone interviews are more cost and time efficient than in-person 
interviews. Telephone interviews are especially appropriate when the research population is 
geographically disperse (Berg, 2001). I conducted the semi-structured interviews over the 
phone because of the diversity in geographic locations of my interview participants. 
 A final important consideration for conducting interviews is how many should be 
conducted. Kvale (1996) recommends conducting about 15 interviews, give or take 10 
depending upon the topic. A better indication of how many interviews to conduct is obtaining 
data saturation (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002). Practical considerations, however, may be the 
defining factor in how many interviews are conducted including time, finances, and access. I 
conducted 13 interviews because I had reached data saturation at this point. 
 
SEMA interviews: Sample, data analysis procedures, and overview of the findings 
I conducted the 13 semi-structured interviews with SEMA communicators in March and 
April 2005 after obtaining the Institutional Review Board’s (IRB) approval. The sample for 
these interviews was SEMA employees charged with public communication. I selected these 
employees because they know the most about whether and how their SEMA is 
communicating with Hispanics. The interviewees came from the top 10 states with the 
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quickest-growing Hispanic populations and the top 10 states with the largest Hispanic 
populations according to the Spring 2005 Census figures, as shown in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1: State Hispanic Populations 
 
Quickest Growing 
 
Largest 
North Carolina 
 
California 
Arkansas Texas 
Georgia New York 
Tennessee Florida 
Nevada Illinois 
South Carolina Arizona 
Alabama New Jersey 
Kentucky New Mexico 
Minnesota Colorado 
Nebraska Nevada 
The titles of my interview subjects varied by state, including public information officer, 
director of communication, and director of public information. In states that had multiple 
employees charged with public communication, I interviewed the highest-ranking employee. 
I contacted the top emergency management communication employee from the 19 states 
identified in Table 2.1. The full interview guide is available in Appendix A. The interviews 
explored the following primary research questions:  
 
RQ1:What role does your agency and state play in crisis communication? 
 
RQ2: How does your agency communicate with the general public before, during, 
and after disasters? 
 
RQ3: How does your agency communicate with Hispanics before, during, and after 
disasters? 
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In addition, I asked two introductory questions to develop rapport: (a) Tell me about your 
background, and (b) What are the major disasters your state faces in a given year? To analyze 
the interview data, I followed the procedures Miles and Huberman (1994) recommend, 
including the use of Atlas.ti to code the data. However, I did not use Atlas.ti for the final 
analysis. 
 Miles and Huberman (1994) recommend three concurrent streams for qualitative data 
analysis: data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing/verification. Data reduction is 
the process of abstracting and simplifying data from field notes and transcriptions. A data 
display summarizes the abstracted data and allows the researcher to draw conclusions. 
During the third stream, conclusion drawing/verification, the researcher verifies the meanings 
that emerge from the data through reviewing the data reductions and data displays.  
 The process of data reduction begins with creating codes, which are “tags or labels for 
assigning units of measurement to the descriptive or inferential information compiled during 
the study” (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 56). Codes can be attached to words, phrases, 
sentences, or whole paragraphs and can be descriptive, interpretive, and/or identify patterns. 
Miles and Huberman recommend creating a provisional start list of codes before beginning 
field work; these codes come from the literature, conceptual framework, research questions, 
and/or hypotheses. They also note, however, that researchers may want to take a more 
inductive theory approach, such as proposed by Strauss and Corbin (1998), by creating codes 
inductively after reviewing the data. A third approach to creating codes in combining etic 
categories (the researcher’s coding categories) with emic categories (the participants’ coding 
categories) by nesting the emic categories within the etic categories. I developed the codes 
for this dissertation by following the third approach: combing emic and etic categories. 
41 
Whatever coding approach is taken, Miles and Huberman recommend creating research 
memos to document coding decisions, which can be used to examine consistency in coding 
decisions and to draw conclusions.  
 When the researcher is ready to synthesize the information from the data reduction stream, 
Miles and Huberman (1994) recommend creating data displays. These displays are visual and 
systematic summaries of the data. It is important to note that by creating a data display the 
researcher has not necessarily completed the data reduction stream; the displays may lead to 
a need to recode the data and to look for additional patterns. According to Miles and 
Huberman, the most frequent form of data display in qualitative research is text. They, 
however, believe that more complex displays provide more valid research conclusions. Thus, 
they propose two primary families of displays: matrices, which are composed of defined 
rows and columns, and networks, which are composed of a series of nodes with links 
between them. Matrices primarily are used for crossing two or more main dimensions or 
variables to determine how they relate. Networks primarily are used for providing narratives 
about events over time as well as showing complex interactions of variables. Within each of 
these families, Miles and Huberman propose multiple variations. Since the primary goal of 
the interviews is to examine common practices and routines in SEMAs, rather than describe 
events over time, matrices are the more appropriate type of display for summarizing the data 
and findings. Two of the multiple matrices that Miles and Huberman outline were employed 
in the analysis of the interview data: checklist matrices and clustered summary matrices. 
 The checklist matrix helps researchers analyze a single variable or concept, such as how 
SEMAs communicate with Hispanics. Miles and Huberman (1994) observe that checklist 
matrices are especially useful for exploring new domains, which is ideal for this dissertation. 
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The checklist matrix contains several components of a single variable, but it does not 
necessarily order these components. The rows of the matrix contain the various components 
of the variable, and the columns contain the factors of interest. For example, a checklist 
matrix for the targeting of Hispanics would have rows outlining how Hispanics are targeted 
with crisis communication and the columns may consist of an example of each targeting 
strategy and how commonly each strategy is employed. Thus, the overarching analysis 
strategy for a checklist matrix is noting patterns or themes and making comparisons.   
 Clustered summary matrices are used to highlight cross-case similarities and differences. 
These matrices are created by partitioning the data from other matrices and clustering like 
themes together into the new summary matrix. The major themes are displayed in the rows of 
the matrix and the columns highlight examples from multiple informants. Clustered summary 
matrices are ideal for bringing together final insights and conclusions. Miles and Huberman 
(1994) affectionately refer to this class of matrices as “monster-dogs” (p. 178). 
 Atlas.ti, a computer program designed to help researchers conduct more systematic and 
thorough qualitative analyses, assisted with the coding and data displays. Miles and 
Huberman (1994) state computer-aided analysis can reduce analysis time, make procedures 
more systematic and explicit, and permit flexibility and revision in analysis procedures. They 
write “By now it is largely taken for granted that you need a good word processor to do 
qualitative research. . .But it’s also fair to say that the researcher who does not use software 
beyond a word processor will be hampered in comparison with those who do” (pp. 43-44).  
 The third concurrent stream that Miles and Huberman (1994) recommend is by far the 
most significant: drawing and verifying conclusions. Miles and Huberman outline 12 tactics 
for generating meaning 
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1.    Noting patterns or themes 
2.    Seeing plausibility 
3.    Clustering 
3.  Making metaphors 
4.  Counting 
5.  Making contrasts/comparison 
6.  Partitioning variables 
7.  Subsuming particulars into general 
8.  Factoring 
9.  Noting relations between variables 
10.  Finding intervening variables 
11.  Building a logical chain of evidence  
12.  Making conceptual/theoretical coherence 
 
The tactics are selected based upon the research study. Depending upon the research study, 
not all of the tactics may be employed. The most important part of this stream, however, is 
verification by both going back to the data and to the participants. Once a conclusion is 
tentatively reached, the researcher should re-examine the codes and data displays for any 
information that may support or counter the conclusion. The researcher should also ask the 
participants and others unfamiliar with the study to verify the soundness of the conclusions. 
Thus, Miles and Huberman’s three-stream approach to qualitative data analysis provides the 
researcher with detailed guidance from the start of the research design through the data 
collection and to the final conclusion drawing. 
 Through applying Miles and Huberman’s (1994) three-stream data analysis approach, I 
noted several significant findings from the SEMA interviews. The following table 
summarizes these findings.  
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Table 2.2: Overview of the SEMA interview findings 
 
Finding 1: Many of the SEMAs in the interview sample do not provide  
disaster information in Spanish. 
 
Finding 2: Some SEMAs, however, provide limited disaster information              
in Spanish. 
 
Finding 3: Local governments primarily are responsible for developing disaster  
information in Spanish. 
 
Finding 4: FEMA helps SEMAs develop disaster information in Spanish after 
disasters occur. 
 
Finding 5: Partnerships are critical for developing disaster information in 
Spanish. 
 
Finding 6: Tensions exist between the various levels of government. 
 
Many of the SEMA communicators in the interview sample do not provide disaster 
information in Spanish. Reasons given for not providing this information include the 
following: the communicators do not have the time and financial resources to develop 
Spanish-language materials; the SEMAs lack Spanish-speaking employees; some 
communicators believe Hispanics do not use the same outlets as the mainstream public; and 
it is not the SEMAs’ responsibility to develop disaster information for Hispanics. 
 All of the SEMA communicators mentioned that they have limited time and financial 
resources to develop any communication piece–in English or Spanish. The communicators 
repeatedly used the phrase “wearing multiple hats” to describe their daily activities. One 
communicator from a Western state said, “There just never is enough time in the day to do 
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everything I want to do in English. I can’t even think about doing things in Spanish.” 
Furthermore, some of the communicators worked for other departments in addition to their 
state SEMA, including the state police department, state department of health, and state 
department of education. These communicators had even less time to develop unique disaster 
communication for Hispanics.  
 Closely linked to lack of time was lack of financial resources to develop disaster 
information for Hispanics. All of the communicators talked about how limited finances 
negatively affected the quality and diversity of their communication outreach. For example, 
one communicator from the Midwest said:  
 We never have enough resources. We print our materials in black and white on 
matte paper. I get so mad when I see FEMA’s materials and they’re printed in six 
colors on glossy paper. We just don’t have the resources to do that. 
 
Other communicators talked about not having enough resources to meet the public’s demand 
for their communication pieces, such as calendars, magnets, and brochures. 
 A couple of the SEMA communicators said they do not produce communication in 
Spanish because no one on their staff speaks Spanish. For example, a communicator from the 
Southeast talked about how she tried to hire a Hispanic public information office, but hired 
an Anglo women who minored in Spanish in college instead. She said: 
One of things we tried to do the last position I had to fill in the public affairs office 
was to hire someone who speaks Spanish. We do have a young lady who got her 
minor in Spanish. She can understand it more than she can speak it. It’s not ideal, but 
it’s better than nothing. 
 
Several other communicators also recognized that having an Anglo provide disaster 
information in Spanish was not as effective as having a Hispanic provide the same 
information. For some of these communicators, the lack of Hispanic employees meant they 
did not provide any communication in Spanish. For other communicators, the lack of 
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Hispanic employees meant they tried to borrow native Spanish-speakers from other state 
agencies when possible.  
 Some of the SEMA communicators said they do not think it is necessary to provide certain 
types of information in Spanish because Hispanics do not use the same resources as the 
Anglo public. This comment mainly referred to posting items in Spanish on the SEMAs’ 
Web sites. For example, one communicator from the West said: 
 We played with the idea of making our Web site bilingual, but the thought process 
was that most people who are savvy enough to get to the Web that speak another 
language know how to use Babble Fish and some of those other things. So I don't 
think we are going to do that.  
 
Other communicators talked about the importance of oral communication in Hispanic culture 
as a way of explaining why they did not produce more written materials in Spanish. 
 Finally, all of the communicators thought it was not the SEMA’s responsibility to develop 
disaster information in Spanish. Some communicators thought other state agencies were 
responsible for developing disaster information in Spanish, such as the office of intercultural 
affairs or the office of Hispanic affairs. For example, one communicator from the Southeast 
said:  
 When the media come and speak with us they want a Hispanic speaker, which is 
not somebody that knows Castilian Spanish that they learned in college. They want 
a Hispanic speaker. So you work with people from other state offices through the 
process of becoming a PIO, at least in the basic PIO class. And they talk with the 
media during a disaster.  
 
In the same vein, all of the communicators thought county and city emergency managers 
primarily are responsible for developing disaster information for special-needs populations 
including Hispanics. This finding will be discussed in greater detail shortly. 
 Despite the fact that most of the SEMA communicators I interviewed do not provide 
disaster information in Spanish, some of them provide a smattering of materials for Hispanics. 
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These materials include Spanish-language tip sheets (n = 4), Spanish-English disaster guides 
(n = 1), Spanish-language brochures (n = 5), Spanish-language Web sites (n = 2), and 
Hispanic media lists (n = 1). Most of this disaster information for Hispanics is developed 
reactively. For example, some SEMAs provide this information because during a past 
disaster they failed to communicate with Hispanics, which resulted in detrimental 
consequences for this population. One SEMA communicator from a Southeast state said: 
 We had a fairly devastating ice storm in our state a few years back during which 
we didn’t provide any information in Spanish. A couple of immigrants died and now 
we are more aware of the need to communicate in Spanish. 
 
Others provide this information because activist groups or local governments convinced their 
SEMA that communicating with Hispanics is necessary. A SEMA communicator from the 
Midwest said: 
 Our two biggest cities have had a really big push. They've actually hired someone 
to do their newsletters, their pamphlets, and their PSAs and different things in 
Spanish. We at the state level haven't done as much as we need to do. But, now we 
are using some of the stuff those two cities developed. 
 
Other SEMA communicators mentioned the importance of local activist organizations and 
the Catholic Church, emphasizing the importance of collaboration in developing disaster 
information for Hispanics.   
 In fact, all of the SEMAs in my sample that provide disaster information in Spanish mainly 
do so through fostering partnerships with other governmental groups or nongovernmental 
organizations. These partnerships vary by state, with four SEMAs collaborating with the 
American Red Cross, one SEMA borrowing information from other states, four SEMAs 
using information developed at the county level, three SEMAs using information developed 
from other agencies within their states, two SEMAs getting help from FEMA, and two 
SEMAs working with a Catholic church. For example, one Southeast communicator 
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commented on how useful the Spanish-language materials provided by the American Red 
Cross are. He said, “Red Cross does them (PSAs) in Spanish. You know the ones for the Red 
Cross are just fine. We don’t have to have ours.” Another communicator from the Midwest 
talked about how the Catholic Church plays a key role in distributing disaster information to 
Hispanics. “The Church is the outlet that helps us target specific non-English-speaking 
languages throughout the state.”  
 Regardless of what partnerships each SEMA fosters, all the SEMA communicators agree 
their agencies are not the governmental unit responsible for developing information for 
special-needs populations, including Hispanics. Rather, counties and cities are responsible 
for communicating with special-needs populations before, during, and after disasters. The 
SEMA communicators frequently mentioned that the emergency management system is a 
“bottom-up system” in which the locals primarily manage disaster communication. The state 
and national governments only become involved when the locals request help. For example, 
one communicator from the West said: 
 The way our system is set up is a bottom-up system. We let the locals not only 
manage their emergencies but also manage their planning and preparedness. The 
system is designed so that the locals are making the decisions and the state is 
supporting those rather than the state stepping in and taking over or managing their 
operations. 
 
This theme of the state as the support agency for the county and city emergency managers 
was echoed in almost all of my interviews. For example, a communicator from the Midwest 
said, “The state is the support agency for the local agencies and jurisdictions. There’s an old 
saying that all politics are local. Emergency management agencies are local too.” Another 
communicator from the West said: 
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 Emergency management at the local level communicates with vulnerable publics. 
They know where shelters are going to be and know the special needs of populations. 
These are local issues that we at the state level rarely need to deal with unless it 
becomes a support issue. For example, if a local agency needed us to get a translator 
we could do that. 
 
The SEMA communicators also noted, however, that local governments are over-burdened 
just like the SEMAs. Thus, even though counties and cities are responsible for 
communicating with Hispanics, they may not have the personnel and financial resources to 
fulfill this responsibility. For example, one communicator from the Midwest said, “I would 
say out of our 15 counties maybe three have someone who is directly responsible for public 
information or more likely it is someone who wears multiple hats. There is a lot of that 
unfortunately.” Another communicator from the Midwest also noted that county and city 
emergency managers are so overburdened with their work that they do not have time to 
develop any disaster communication in English or Spanish. These locals do not even have 
time to disseminate disaster communication already produced by their SEMA. She said:  
 In the last five or six years, in particular, we have piled onto the local emergency 
managers so many other things that even with all the help the state and I give them, 
they can’t do their job. For example, for severe weather awareness week they may 
literally only have time to touch base with a TV station, a radio station, and one 
newspaper in their area, where years before they could go visit the schools, they could 
run an article or series of articles, they could do their own little monitoring, etc. Their 
time has gotten so consumed by all these other planning, exercising, and training 
requirements and reporting they look at me and I say April, severe weather awareness 
week, and they look at me with the glazed eyes and say oh yeah, right. And I don't 
blame them. 
 
According to the SEMA communicators, however, the locals are not alone in developing 
disaster information in Spanish. They noted that the SEMA helps counties and cities when 
asked to do so. For example, one communicator from the Midwest said:  
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 If necessary, we'll go ahead and probably put out public service announcements or 
anything that the local governments needs if they are overwhelmed and need our 
support. Anything they need our support for at all and we would go ahead and help 
them with that. 
 
Other communicators noted they constantly send the locals tools they can use to develop and 
disseminate communication pieces. For example, one communicator from the West said:  
 I send out a weekly information report from our office to local offices of the 
things that are happening throughout the state such a severe weather awareness 
week, and those are also available on our Web site. Everything is on our Web site. 
 
The fact that many of the SEMA communicators admitted that they are not in regular contact 
with the local emergency managers, however, indicated counties and cities most likely do not 
receive a lot of help from their SEMAs. Locals, however, may receive more help from 
FEMA, especially after disasters occur. 
 All of the SEMA communicators mentioned the important role FEMA plays in disaster 
recovery and especially in developing communication materials for special-needs 
populations. After disasters, FEMA mainly provides additional resources such as bilingual 
public information officers and sets up the joint information center. For example, a 
communicator from the West said:  
 FEMA is here working out of a joint field office for all of the flooding that 
occurred. They did send us a multilingual person. And it's great. She has been really 
helpful for me because she is able to speak Spanish. She's been able to do a lot of 
stuff that I can't or don't have time to do.  
 
Other communicators noted FEMA staff can help better explain to the public what federal 
resources are available for disaster survivors. For example, a communicator from the 
Midwest said: 
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 Well, it takes a huge load off of us because I don't claim to be an expert on how 
FEMA operates and their programs so certainly when we've got them here they 
can handle those kinds of questions. And they do the majority of the writing and 
getting the press releases ready and signed off on their hands and then we handle 
it on this end.  
 
Despite the additional resources FEMA provides, however, the SEMA communicators I 
interviewed predominately viewed FEMA’s post-disaster help as a necessary evil. This 
majority recognized they could not handle the post-disaster communication responsibilities 
without FEMA’s help, but they also thought FEMA was not in touch with their states’ needs 
when they arrived after disasters. For example, a communicator from the Southeast said, 
“Once FEMA comes in we are overrun with Femites. The Femites come in large numbers. 
They can always put more people in the field than we can and they always show pictures of 
them, not us, doing anything.” Only two of my 13 interview participants expressed an overall 
positive impression of FEMA, whereas the other 11 expressed highly negative impressions of 
FEMA. This overwhelming negative impression of FEMA revealed the tensions that exist 
between the SEMAs and FEMA. Likewise, the finding that the SEMAs believe locals are 
responsible for developing disaster information in Spanish, but do not have the resources to 
do so, also highlights the potential for tension among the county, city, and state emergency 
managers. It is possible that county and city emergency managers may resent the fact that the 
state has more resources than they do but expects them to develop and distribute disaster 
information in Spanish. 
 For the purpose of this dissertation, the most significant findings from the interviews are as 
follows: (a) SEMAs do not believe they are responsible for communicating in Spanish, (b) 
those states that provide disaster information in Spanish do so through partnerships; and (c) 
tensions exist among the federal, state, and county governments. The interview findings also 
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indicated that the next phase of my research, the survey, must examine the county level of 
government rather than the state level since the SEMAs unanimously agreed counties 
primarily are responsible for developing disaster information in Spanish. Also, the survey 
must further examine the role of relationships in developing disaster information in Spanish 
given how important partnerships are at the state level. All of the interview findings 
contributed to the development of the research questions and hypotheses and the survey 
instrument, which are discussed later. These findings also contributed to the identification of 
a theory appropriate for analyzing public sector crisis communication: principal-agent theory. 
In the next section, I provide an overview of principal-agent theory, including how the theory 
led to the development of research questions and hypotheses for the survey. 
 
Principal-agent theory 
 Given that the interviews identified relationships as pivotal for developing disaster 
information in Spanish, I returned to the literature to find a theory that would help explain the 
role of relationships in the public sector. I discovered Sylves’ 2004 article on the application 
of political science theory to emergency management. In this article, Sylves observes: 
 Principal agent theory seems most appropriate for the world of emergency    
 management. Government emergency managers work in a universe of federal,  
 state, local, and private sector agencies. An immense amount of government  
 emergency management work involves the use of private contractors and non- 
 profit volunteer organizations. Information flows among agents and principals,  
 influencing the decision of principals in matters of fund distribution, budgeting,  
 planning, program administration, and management in general. (pp. 7-8) 
 
Origin of principal-agent theory 
Principal-agency theory originated from the field of economics as a way to conceptualize 
how owners of large firms (principals) can ensure that managers and stakeholders (agents) 
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make decisions congruent with the owner’s desires (Gerber & Teske, 2000; Laffin, 1997; 
Rees, 1985; Ross, 1973; Simonsen & Hill, 1998). According to the theory, agents are 
expected to act loyally to the principal, and any benefits that flow to the agent as a result of 
the contract between the principal and the agent should be revealed to the principal 
(Simonsen & Hill, 1998). Agents, however, seek ways to “shirk” their work responsibilities 
and to act in their best interests regardless of the principal’s interest (Chubb, 1985; Laffin, 
1997). Thus, to ensure that the principal’s interests are maintained, principals must reduce the 
agents’ desire and ability to act opportunistically through contractual arrangements and 
offering incentives, primarily in the form of monetary compensation (Arrow, 1985; Gerber & 
Teske, 2000; Ross, 1973).  
 If the agent does not fulfill the contractual agreement with care, duty, and obedience, then 
a “principal-agent problem” exists (Bendor, 1988; Gerber & Teske, 2000). The heart of this 
principal-agent problem is information asymmetry and goal conflicts that result from 
hierarchical relationships (Bendor, 1988; Chubb, 1985). The agent is likely to pursue his or 
her own interests (resulting in goal conflicts), and the principal is likely to have less 
information than the agent about the agent’s performance (resulting in information 
asymmetry); (Gerber & Teske, 2000). The principal does not monitor the agent because 
monitoring is expensive (Bendor, 1988). Thus, the central question is whether the principal 
can devise an incentive scheme that provides the agent with a stake in the principal’s 
interests (Chubb, 1985; Simonsen & Hill, 1998). 
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Application of principal-agent theory to the public sector 
 Although the concept of principal-agent theory existed in the political science literature 
before 1984, Moe is credited with explicitly introducing the theory into the political science 
literature (Chubb, 1985; Gerber & Teske, 2000). Principals in the public sector can include 
citizens, the president, legislator, courts, governors, bureaucrats, interest groups, and others. 
Agents in the public sector can include bureaucrats, legislators, courts, and others. Moe 
(1984) argues that principal-agent theory greatly enhances understanding of the problem of 
political control of bureaucracy, but it must be adapted to better fit the public sector 
environment. First, politicians as principals in the public sector are not primarily motivated 
by productive efficiency as are principals in the private sector. Rather, principals in the 
public sector are motivated by attaining larger budgets, policy support, career opportunities, 
and security. Thus, because principals are not concerned with economic efficiency, they will 
not hold agents to the standard of economic efficiency.  
 Also, public sector principals may not be interested in all of the agents’ activities and will 
only focus on those that directly affect their political careers. Thus, principals are not 
necessarily motivated to ensure that agents fulfill all of their responsibilities in the public 
sector. And, even if principals want to monitor agents, political effectiveness, such as 
reputation, is much harder to measure than economic effectiveness, such as share price.  
 Public sector principals also are more constrained by accountability requirements and thus 
have far less flexibility in exerting control over agents than do private sector managers. For 
example, public sector principals often are not involved in the hiring, firing, and promotion 
of agents. And, in the public sector, any given agent is controlled by multiple principals. 
Thus, agents are not under the control of any single principal, which undermines the 
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principals’ political control over agents. To effectively apply principal-agent theory in the 
public sector, researchers must look at monitoring devices and incentive structures that 
mitigate the principal-agent problem while still incorporating the multiple principal-agent 
relationships inherent to the public sector. 
 Since Moe’s seminal article in 1984, other researchers have further developed how 
principal-agency theory must be modified when applied to the public sector, primarily 
focusing on information asymmetry and goal conflicts. Researchers note the issue of 
information asymmetry in the public sector often means that agents, as bureaucrats, may 
have more expertise in an area than do principals (Ringquist, 1995; Songer, Segel, & 
Cameron, 1994). Ringquist observes:  
 Bureaucrats understand standard operating procedures, the intricacies of 
organizational communication, and the true costs of administrative activities much 
better than their elected superiors do. Bureaucrats then use this information advantage 
to obtain resources from these superiors and make policy decisions consistent with 
bureaucratic values. (pp. 337) 
 
Thus, in the public sector, information asymmetry may produce a positive net yield rather 
than a negative net yield as it does in the private sector.  
 Waterman and Meier (1998) note pure information asymmetry may not be as common in 
the public sector as it is in the private sector. In the public sector, there are multiple agents 
(both within and across agencies) with potentially multiple and conflicting goals. Also unlike 
in the private sector, principals in the public sector rarely are unitary actors that speak with 
one voice (e.g., Congress). Thus, in the public sector, agents have incentives to ally 
themselves with principals who share their goals and interests. Conversely, when agents do 
not share principals’ goals, agents have an incentive to leak information to competing 
principals. Further, in the public sector agents may possess more information than principals.  
56 
 Likewise, researchers note that while in the private sector principals and agents clearly 
have different goals and/or preferences, this is not necessarily true in the public sector 
(Waterman & Meier, 1998; Worsham, Eisner, & Ringquist, 1997). In the private sector 
principals want to maximize profits and agents want to do as little work as possible. But, in 
the public sector, with a focus on policy, principals and agents may not even possess 
conflicting goals. Thus, Waterman and Meier (1998) propose treating both information 
asymmetry and goal conflict as continuous rather than constant variables to account for 
variability encountered in principal-agent relationships in the public sector.  
 Critics of principal-agent theory applied to the public sector focus on two related points: 
blurring of principal-agent roles and the hierarchical relationship proposed by the theory. In 
the public sector, actors can serve as both agents and principals. Researchers note principals 
can include citizens, the president, legislators, courts, governors, bureaucrats, interest groups, 
and others. Agents can include bureaucrats, legislators, courts, and others. The fact that 
public sector actors can serve as both agents and principals blurs the hierarchical 
relationships posited by the theory and complicates the application of the theory to the public 
sector (Gerber & Teske, 2000; Worsham et al., 1997). These dual-role relationships may lead 
to loose accountability measures (Breauz, Duncan, Keller, & Morris, 2002). Because of this 
blurring of principal-agent relationships, some researchers claim these complex relationships 
may nullify any clarifying advantages from principal-agent theory (McCubbins, Noll, & 
Weingast, 1989; Moe & Wilson, 1994; Waterman & Meier, 1998; Wolley, 1993; Worsham 
et al., 1997). 
 Another common critique of principal-agent theory applied to the public sector is the 
theory construes relationships as rigid, but in the public sector relationships are dynamic 
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(Feldman & Khademian, 2002; Waterman & Meir, 1998; Worsham et al., 1997). Thus, in the 
public sector, agents’ and principals’ goals evolve over time, making goal conflict less 
relevant in the public sector. Rather than discarding a relatively parsimonious theory of 
political influence over policy outcomes, however, several researchers argue principal-agent 
theory should be extended to better fit the public sector (DiIulio, 1994; Gerber & Teske, 
2000; Worsham et al., 1997). Ironically, many of the researchers echo the original comments 
made by Moe (1984).  
 Worsham et al. (1997) suggest modifying principal-agency theory so that it incorporates 
the fact that for any policy issue multiple agents work together. Thus, the notion of control is 
not as important in principal-agent theory applied to the public sector as it is when the theory 
is applied to the private sector because actors serve as both principals and agents across 
policy issues and time; this “complex web of interrelationships and activities” muddles 
sources of communication and authority (p. 435). Worsham et al. also note that the norm for 
the public sector is disequilibrium, and policy formulation and application are not fluid. 
Political organizations are dynamic, constantly adapting to policy changes and receiving 
information from a variety of sources, including the public and private sector. Further, 
principals can choose from a wide variety of strategies in order to control agents. And, agents 
are less likely to be self-interested when their policy goals are congruent with the principal’s 
policy goals regardless of compensation. Significantly, contractual methods of control as 
proposed by the original principal-agent theory may not be as useful as other methods of 
control.  
 DiIulio (1994) adds many researchers have erroneously concluded that principal-agent 
theory is better at explaining why bureaucrats shirk than at explaining why bureaucrats 
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behave as “principled agents:” workers who do not shirk even without incentives. The true 
value of principal-agency theory as applied to the public sector is explaining why agents do 
not shirk. DiIulio observes people who want meaningful job challenges, not just job security, 
and who desire compensation for extra effort are not interested in government jobs. Thus, 
researchers applying principal-agent theory to the public sector need to explain why 
intangible incentives, such as public good, drive some government employees to not shirk.  
 Principal-agent theory has been applied to a wide variety of topics in the field of political 
science: relationships between citizens and officials (Kalt & Zupan, 1984); legislative bodies, 
coalitions, and bureaucratic agencies (Banks & Weingast, 1992; Bendor, Taylor, & Van 
Gaalen, 1987; Calvert, Moran, & Weingast, 1987; Epstein & O’Halloran, 1994; Laffin, 1997; 
McCubbins, 1985); public policy impact and adoption (Breauz et al., 2002; Feiock & West, 
1993; Ringquist, 1995); legislative control of bureaucracy (Ogul & Rockman, 1990); 
congressional leadership (Sinclair, 1999); higher and lower courts (Brent, 1999; Songer et al., 
1994); presidential appointees and agencies (Moe, 1985; Wood 1988, 1989; Wood & 
Waterman, 1991, 1993); and upper- and lower-level bureaucrats (Hammond, 1986; Miller, 
1992). A search of the literature did not reveal any previous applications of principal-agent 
theory to public relations.  
 
Principal-agent theory applied to government public communication 
 Applied to government public communication, principal-agency theory examines the 
development and implementation of communication policy issues such as providing Spanish-
language disaster information. The key to understanding how the theory is applied to 
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government public communication is understanding how information asymmetry and goal 
conflicts affect policy issues.  
Information asymmetry may emerge when principals do not monitor how agents address 
a policy issue. Agents often have more knowledge about how to best address policy issues 
because they are closer to the people the issues affect. As a result, principals may believe 
that it is best for agents to address policy issues. However, agents may decide they do not 
want to address a policy issue for various reasons (lack of skills, lack of time, lack of 
interest, etc.). Thus, if there is no formal monitoring system between the principals and 
agents, agents may decide to ignore the policy issue, thereby shirking their responsibilities. 
Principals, however, may not be aware that the agents decided to ignore a policy issue 
because no formal monitoring system exists. The end result may be that a policy issue is 
left unaddressed by principals and agents alike. Conversely, the agents may decide to 
address the policy issue in a manner counter to the principals’ interests. Once again 
because there is no monitoring system, principals do not know how the agents address the 
policy issue.  
 Goal conflict emerges when principals and agents do not have the same goals for a 
policy issue. For example, the Department of Homeland Security may think fighting 
terrorism abroad is the number-one priority, while local government officials may think 
developing communication materials about natural disaster mitigation is the number-one 
priority. The result of goal conflicts is that agents have the opportunity to shirk by not 
implementing the principal’s goal. If the agents decide to shirk, they can shirk by passing 
the principal’s goal off to another agent, or agents can shirk by pursuing their own goals to 
the extent that is possible. The latter form of shirking is most effective when principals do 
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not closely monitor agents’ actions and agents have the financial resources to pursue their 
own goals. Of course, it also is possible that agents may fulfill their responsibilities of 
addressing the policy issue.  
 By applying principal-agent theory to the survey of county emergency managers, I 
analyze the complex relationships among the multiple actors who formulate decisions on 
whether and how to develop Spanish-language disaster information. Focusing on the 
potential for goal conflicts and information asymmetry, I will determine if and how county 
relationships with FEMA, states, other counties, community groups, private sector 
organizations, and public interest groups affect the development of Spanish-language disaster 
information.  
 
Research questions and hypotheses 
 The application of principal-agent theory combined with the interview insights led to the 
development of the following research questions and hypotheses for the second phase of the 
research, a survey of county emergency management directors. 
RQ1: What channels do counties employ to provide disaster information in Spanish before,
during, and after disasters?
This question explores what channels counties use to reach Hispanics, such as brochures, 
public service announcements, and flyers. The list of channels the survey tested came from 
the SEMA interviews and a content analysis examining the communication materials 
available on all 50 SEMA Web sites (Liu, 2006b). Based on the interview findings, I predict 
the majority of the counties will not provide disaster information in Spanish. Further, based 
on the interview findings, I predict counties that do provide disaster information in Spanish 
report relying on written rather than oral channels of communication. If my second prediction 
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is supported, this finding would be significant given that Hispanic culture prioritizes oral 
over written communication (Marin & Marin, 1991).   
H1a: Most counties do not provide disaster information in Spanish. 
H1b: Counties that provide disaster information in Spanish primarily use written 
channels of communication (e.g., brochures, news releases, and fact sheets) rather 
than oral channels of communication (e.g., public service announcements, video news 
releases, and community meetings).
The second research question explores factors that affect whether counties provide disaster 
information in Spanish. It is important to measure the relative importance of relationships 
compared to other factors because principal-agent theory poses that the relationship between 
principals and agents control the development of public policy, such as providing disaster 
information in Spanish. In the case of emergency management, however, it is possible that 
more practical considerations, such as budget, control the development of public policy.  
RQ2: What factors affect whether counties provide Spanish-language disaster information 
before, during, and after disasters?  
H2a. The larger the county emergency management staff, the greater the number of 
channels counties employ to communicate Spanish-language disaster information. 
 
H2b. The larger the local Hispanic population, the greater the number of channels 
counties employ to communicate Spanish-language disaster information. 
 
H2c: The more annual fiscal support provided by the national, state, and county 
governments for public communication, the greater the number of channels counties 
employ to communicate Spanish-language disaster information. 
 
H2d: The larger the average number of disasters experienced in a year in the state 
and county, the greater the number of channels counties employ to communicate 
Spanish-language disaster information. 
 
H2e: The larger the number of Spanish-speaking emergency management employees 
the county has, the greater the number of channels counties employ to communicate 
Spanish-language disaster information. 
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H2f: The more groups the county works with to provide disaster information in 
Spanish, the greater the number of channels counties employ to communicate 
Spanish-language disaster information. 
 
The third research question measures the potential for information asymmetry among the 
national, state, and local governments. As defined by principal-agent theory, information 
asymmetry exists when principals and agents possess different information about a policy 
issue. For my dissertation, information asymmetry exists when the national, state, and local 
governments possess different information about how to communicate disaster information to 
Hispanics. One way to measure whether these governments possess different information is 
through identifying with who counties work with to develop Spanish-language disaster 
information. If counties overall work with the same groups to provide disaster information in 
Spanish, then the potential for information asymmetry may be less. Conversely, if counties 
work unilaterally or with different groups, then the potential for information asymmetry may 
be greater. To measure the potential for information-asymmetry from the county perspective, 
research question three asks: 
RQ3a: How often do county emergency managers work with various governmental and 
nongovernmental groups to provide disaster information in Spanish? 
In addition, research question three also asks when counties work most with groups: before, 
during, and after disasters. This second part of research question three helps identify when 
information-asymmetry is most likely to emerge, if at all, among the county, state, and 
federal governments.  
RQ3b: Do counties work most with governmental and nongovernmental groups before, 
during, and/or after disasters to provide disaster information in Spanish?
Both parts of research question three compare how often counties work with governmental 
groups to nongovernmental groups before, during, and after disasters. It is important to 
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compare governmental to nongovernmental groups to measure the importance of 
nongovernmental groups in developing disaster information for Hispanics. Nongovernmental 
groups may be able to ameliorate information-asymmetry among various levels of 
government. Likewise, nongovernmental groups may be more influential in helping counties 
develop disaster information in Spanish. Thus, the possibility for information-asymmetry 
among county, state, and local governments may be less significant because these 
nongovernmental groups may frequently work with all levels of government, sharing how to 
best provide disaster information in Spanish.   
 The fourth and fifth research questions measure the degree of goal conflict between the 
county and city, county and state, and county and national governments. Principal-agent 
theory states goal conflict occurs when principals and agents have different goals for a policy 
issue. For my survey, I measure goal conflict with two questions. Research question four 
asks: 
RQ4: Who do county emergency managers believe should be responsible for producing 
disaster information in Spanish? 
Based on the SEMA interviews, I found that states believe counties are most responsible for 
producing disaster information in Spanish. Depending upon who the county emergency 
management directors believe is responsible for producing disaster information in Spanish, I 
may find that a goal conflict exists between the states and counties as to who is responsible 
for producing disaster information in Spanish.  
 Research question five further probes for the existence of goal conflicts by asking: 
RQ5: How capable do county emergency managers believe governmental and 
nongovernmental groups are of producing high quality Spanish-language disaster 
information?
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It is important to ask how capable various groups are of producing disaster information 
because goal conflicts are likely to be more complicated, and thus more influential, when 
agents think principals are responsible for producing Spanish-language disaster information, 
but are not capable of producing this information. For example, my interviews revealed that 
while states think FEMA partially is responsible for helping provide Spanish-language 
disaster information, they do not believe FEMA is capable of producing high quality 
Spanish-language disaster information.  
No specific hypotheses were produced for research questions three, four, and five 
given that this is the first study to apply principal-agent theory to public sector crisis 
communication. Further, very limited research has been conducted on emergency 
management, making it difficult to draw from the literature to create hypotheses for these 
research questions.   
 
The survey instrument 
 The survey instrument contains five sections of questions. The first section collects data on 
how many channels counties employ to communicate English-language and Spanish-
language disaster information. The respondents identified whether they employ each of 15 
different channels to communicate disaster information in English and/or Spanish. The 
second section collects data on who the respondents believe should be responsible for 
producing disaster information in Spanish. The respondents rated 12 groups on a scale of one 
(low responsibility) to five (high responsibility). The third section collects data on who the 
respondents believe is most capable of producing high quality disaster information in Spanish. 
The respondents rated 12 groups on a scale of one (low capability) to five (high capability). 
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The fourth section collects data on how often the counties work with particular groups to 
provide disaster information in Spanish. The respondents rated 13 groups on a scale of one 
(not often) to five (very often). The respondents also indicated whether they worked most 
often with each of the groups before, during, and/or after disasters. The last section collects 
background data on the counties. This section has 17 background questions such as the size 
of the local Hispanic population, the total communication budget, and the number of 
Spanish-speaking emergency management employees counties have. Appendix B displays 
the survey. 
 
Research phase II: Survey of county emergency management communicators 
 The next section outlines the sample, data collection, and data analysis techniques for the 
survey.  
 
Survey sample, data collection techniques, and data analysis procedures 
 I decided to conduct a survey because I want to provide a baseline of how counties 
develop and provide Spanish-language disaster information. A survey allows the collection 
of a large amount of valid and reliable data in a relatively short amount of time. A survey 
also leads to the identification of “best practice” examples for future research by identifying 
counties that are doing a superior job of developing crisis information for Hispanics.  
 I designed the survey questionnaire from the SEMA communicators interview findings 
and the literature. I selected counties as the population because all of the SEMA 
communicators I interviewed agreed counties are responsible for communicating with 
special-needs populations, including Hispanics. The dissemination of the survey followed the 
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tailored design method outlined by Dillman (2000) and was administered via mail, Internet, 
and telephone. Participants selected the response method that best fit their needs and 
preferences.  
 The purpose of the survey is to understand the extent to which county emergency 
management directors and their staff communicate with Hispanics before, during, and after 
disasters. Also, the survey aims to test the explanatory power of principal-agent theory for 
public sector crisis communication research.   
 
Validity.  
 There are three main types of validity identified in the literature as important for 
quantitative research: content, concurrent, and construct (Creswell, 2003). The most 
important type of validity for survey research is content validity, which evaluates whether the 
survey instrument measures what it is intended to measure (Creswell, 2003; Nardi, 2003; 
Wimmer & Dominick, 2003). For this study, content validity was strengthened by pre-testing 
the survey instrument with 19 members of the emergency management community. The pre-
test participants included city emergency managers, county emergency managers, and state 
emergency management directors from across the country. Most importantly, the pre-test 
helped refine the instructions for each set of questions, ensuring that the respondents 
conceptualized the questions the same way that I did. For example, when I asked the pre-test 
participants how they defined capability to produce Spanish-language disaster information, 
they agreed that capability was based on financial resources, communication expertise, and 
Spanish-language skills. The pre-test also helped add important missing categories to the 
background questions, add additional questions to the background section, and reformat the 
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survey into a grid format. Thus, the pre-test significantly changed the wording and structure 
of the survey instructions and questions. 
 
Sample. 
 I mailed the survey to a purposive sample: all of the county emergency management 
directors within the 10 states with largest Hispanic populations and the 10 states with the 
quickest growing Hispanic populations (N = 1,535). Researchers select purposive samples 
when the sample displays certain desirable characteristics or traits, such as counties with 
large or rapidly growing Hispanic population (Fowler, 2002; Nardi, 2003), or when the 
researcher is limited by time or finances (Comstock & McCombs, 1981; Fowler, 2002). A 
common critique of purposive samples is that they are not generalizable to the population 
(Babbie, 2005; Comstock & McCombs, 1981; Creswell, 2003). Since the purpose of the 
survey is to provide baseline information about how counties communicate disaster 
information to Hispanics, it is important to survey counties that are likely to communicate 
with Hispanics. The interviews with the SEMA communicators highlighted that most states 
and counties are not doing much to communicate disaster information to Hispanics. A 
random survey of all U.S. counties would most likely replicate these findings without adding 
much insight. A survey of counties that are most likely to communicate emergency 
management information to Hispanics, conversely, is likely to produce more meaningful 
insights.  
 I obtained the contact information for the county emergency management directors 
through the state emergency management agencies. Initially, the vast majority of the states 
had trouble finding this contact information for me. All but one of the states eventually 
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provided me with the contact information for their county emergency management directors; 
I had to find the contact information for New York’s county emergency management 
directors through searching online. Also, many of the states provided outdated addresses and 
phone numbers for their county emergency management directors. Most of the states did not 
have the names of their county emergency management directors. 
 
Administration. 
 Before administering the survey, I obtained IRB approval for the survey instrument and 
recruitment materials. I followed Dillman’s tailored design survey method (2000) to 
administer the survey: 
1.  Sent a brief prenotice letter to the county emergency managers. 
2.  Mailed a detailed cover letter. 
3.  Mailed a thank-you postcard. 
4.  Mailed a replacement questionnaire to nonresponders. 
5.  Called nonresponders. 
The purpose of these steps is to increase the survey’s response rate. In addition, I obtained 
the endorsement of the International Emergency Managers Association, the largest 
professional emergency management association. The executive director of the association 
wrote a letter (displayed in Appendix C) encouraging counties to complete the survey, which 
I mailed with the survey questionnaire. 
 The first step of my recruitment process involved sending a prenotice letter, which briefly 
outlined the purpose and significance of the study and why the recipient received the letter. 
The letter, displayed in Appendix D, focused on building anticipation rather than providing 
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details about study participation (Dillman, 2000). Research shows that sending prenotice 
letters significantly increases the response rate for surveys (Dillman, 2000; Dillman, Clark, & 
Sinclair, 1995; Fowler, 2002; Wimmer & Dominick, 2003). The letter was sent nonprofit 
bulk mail and arrived only a few days before the first questionnaire.  
 The second step involved mailing the questionnaire, a brief cover letter, and the 
International Association of Emergency Manager’s endorsement letter. The purpose of the 
one-page cover letter (displayed in Appendix E) was to explain why the recipient was being 
contacted and why the survey was useful and important (Dillman, 2000). By highlighting the 
importance of the study, researchers can increase response rates (Comstock & McCombs, 
1981). The cover letter was printed on university stationary, dated, and signed by the 
researcher. The cover letter explained confidentiality and gave the participants a person to 
contact if they have questions (Dillman, 2000). In addition, the cover letter explained that by 
completing the survey the participants were consenting to participate in the research study. 
Finally, the cover letter offered the opportunity to complete the enclosed mail survey or to 
complete the survey online. Offering two methods of completing the survey increases the 
survey response rate (Dillman, 2000). The questionnaire, cover letter, and endorsement letter 
were sent nonprofit bulk mail and included a postage-paid return envelope for the survey.  
 The third step, the thank you postcard, jogged the memory of participants who had 
responded and thanked participants who already have responded (Dillman, 2000). Research 
indicates that nearly half of survey respondents postmark their surveys within two to three 
days after they receive them (Dillman, 2000). Thus, the postcard, displayed in Appendix F, 
was sent about a week after the survey questionnaire was sent to encourage nonresponders to 
complete the survey–either the print version they were mailed or the online version. 
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Although it would have been ideal just to send the postcard to nonresponders, the entire 
sample received the postcards because it would have been too time consuming to identify the 
nonresponders given the short time frame in which the postcards had to be mailed (Dillman, 
2000). By making the postcard dual purpose, to thank responders and remind nonresponders, 
the postcard sent a relevant message to all members of the sample. 
 The fourth step, sending the replacement questionnaire with a follow-up letter, was only 
sent to nonresponders to stimulate response (Babbie, 2005; Dillman, 2000). This follow-up 
letter, displayed in Appendix G, had a different tone than the previous mailing: it was more 
insistent and urgent than the previous contacts (Dillman, 2000). The follow-up letter 
encouraged county emergency management directors to complete the mail questionnaire or 
complete the survey online. The replacement questionnaire and follow-up letter were sent 
about three weeks after the first questionnaire was sent.  
 The fifth, and final contact, involved calling the participants to ask if they had any 
questions about the survey. During this phone call, I offered the opportunity of completing 
the survey over the phone or online.  Dillman (2000) notes that phone calls can reassure 
participants who are confused about the nature of the study and encourage participants to 
complete the survey. Fowler (2002) states that a personal contact can be significantly more 
effective than a letter in persuading people to participate in research. Administering surveys 
by multiple modes can significantly increase the response rate but can also introduce 
potential sources of mode differences including social desirability, acquiescence, question-
order-effects, and primacy/recency effects. Social desirability refers to the fact that people 
are more likely to give socially desirable answers when responding to questions over the 
phone than in print (Dillman, 2000; Wimmer & Dominick, 2003). Acquiescence is the 
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tendency for people from some cultures to agree with the researcher regardless of the topic, 
which is a potential problem especially during phone interviews (Dillman, 2000). Question-
order effects describe the potential for respondents to change their answers to one question 
based upon another question, which is a potential problem for mail interviews (Dillman, 
2000). Finally, primacy/recency effects refer to the tendency to choose the first-offered 
answer category rather than the last-offered answer category in telephone surveys (Dillman, 
2000).  
 Sources of potential mode differences for the survey of county emergency management 
directors include socially desirable answers, question-order effects, and primacy/recency 
effects. Acquiescence is not a potential source of mode differences since all of the 
respondents are acculturated into American culture and thus not come from cultures in which 
acquiescence is likely to be a problem. To moderate the potential for the other three sources 
of mode differences, the surveys completed via mail and via telephone were compared.  
 As other researchers have noted, both mail and telephone surveys possess several 
limitations. For mail surveys, the researcher does not have control over who responds and 
what percentage responds (Comstock & McCombs, 1981; Miller, 1991; Trochim, 2001; 
Wimmer & Dominick, 2003). Also, mail surveys do not allow the researcher to probe or ask 
for elaboration (Comstock & McCombs, 1981). Response rates for mail surveys tend to be 
lower than for telephone surveys (Fowler, 2002; Wimmer & Dominick, 2003), and the data 
collection period takes longer (Babbie, 2005; Fowler, 2002). Those who answer mail surveys 
may differ significantly from those who do not answer the surveys (Babbie, 2005; Miller, 
1991). Finally, question-order effects are more of a problem for mail surveys because 
responders are capable of changing answers to early questions based upon answers to later 
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questions (Dillman, 2000). Limitations for telephone surveys include a higher likelihood for 
negative acquiescence and social desirability effects (Dillman, 2000). Despite these 
limitations, a survey is the best method to obtain a large amount of data because it is more 
cost effective and less time consuming than qualitative methods such as interviews (Babbie, 
2005; Miller, 1991; Wimmer & Dominick, 2003).  
 The next chapter presents the findings from the survey, beginning with the response rate 
and then comparing the data collected from the mail and telephone survey administrations. 
The chapter concludes with the results from the analyses of the survey data. 
Chapter 3: Survey Implementation and Findings 
Sample and response rate 
 After I compiled the addresses for all 1,535 county emergency management agencies, the 
post office identified 106 of these addresses as undeliverable. I could not find alternative 
addresses for these agencies and consequently removed them from the sample. Thus, the first 
three survey mailings were sent to 1,429 county emergency management directors. Three 
weeks after the replacement survey (the fourth and final mailing) was sent to all 
nonresponders, I had received a total of 227 completed mail surveys and three completed 
Internet surveys. Within these surveys, 12 responders reported that they managed two 
counties, three responders reported they managed three counties, and two responders 
reported they managed five counties. Thus, the total individual directors that could respond 
to the survey was lowered from 1,429 to 1,403, yielding a 16.4% response rate from the four 
survey mailings. 
 Following Dillman’s tailored design procedure, I called a random sample of the 
nonresponders to obtain completed surveys from 10% of the nonresponders (n = 117). To 
obtain these 117 surveys, I made 757 phone calls. Of these 757 phone calls, I spoke with 199 
directors. I was not able to reach the other 558 directors because they were either out of the 
office or in a meeting. Thirteen of these 199 directors said they had already completed the 
mail survey. Of the remaining 186 directors, 100 completed the telephone survey and 17 
completed the Internet survey, for a response rate of 62.9% for the telephone administration. 
While conducting the phone calls, I also received an additional 88 surveys in the mail, 
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making the total count for the mail surveys 318 and the total count for the phone surveys 117. 
Thus, the total response rate for the survey was 31% (n = 435).  
 
Comparing the mail and telephone respondents 
 Before conducting the analyses to address my research questions, I first determined 
whether there was a statistically significant difference between the responses from the mail 
and telephone survey administrations. To determine whether the mail and phone samples 
responded differently to the survey questions, I conducted a series of independent sample t-
tests for the survey’s demographic and content variables. I did not find significant differences 
for the 12 demographic variables (Table 3.1) but did find some significant differences for the 
nine content variables (Table 3.2). However, after controlling for the family wise error rate 
using Bonferroni’s correction (R = .002), only two of the t-tests indicated a statistically 
significant difference: the total number of channels counties employ to communicate 
English-language disaster information and the total number of channels for which counties 
do not provide disaster information in English or Spanish. Because I did not find significant 
differences for the 12 demographic variables for the mail and telephone survey respondents I 
decided to analyze the data as one sample while keeping in mind that two of the content 
variables did differ significantly.       
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Table 3.1: Results from the t-tests comparing mail and telephone responses for demographic 
variables  
 
Variable Mail Telephone 
 
t p
Full-time     
employees 
M = 2.84
SD = 5.26
M = 2.30
SD = 6.10
.906 .365
Part-time 
employees 
M = 1.16
SD = 2.86
M = 1.15
SD = 5..03
.003 .997
Volunteers M = 17.47
SD = 41.00
M = 25.50
SD = 70.20
-1.16 .246
Number of 
Spanish- 
speaking 
employees 
M = 1.04
SD = 3.42
M = 1.24
SD = 3.20
-.522 .602
Number of state 
disasters in past 
five years 
M = 5.69
SD = 6.29
M = 5.99
SD = 5.70
-.386 .700
Number of 
county disasters 
in past five 
years 
M = 3.85
SD = 4.05
M = 3.27
SD = 3.53
1.34 .181
Budget for 
public 
communication 
M = 238.12
SD = 890.59
M = 413.90
SD = 1692.93
-.849 .398
Percent of 
budget for 
information in 
Spanish 
M = 6.15
SD = 15.23
M = 4.23
SD = 11.61
1.20 .231
Ideal public 
communication 
budget 
M = 4918.86
SD = 13436.22
M = 3954.17
SD = 9922.70
.327 .745
Percent of ideal 
budget for 
information in 
Spanish 
M = 21.59
SD = 21.00
M = 27.71
SD = 24.19
-2.47 .014
Years in current 
position 
M = 7.69
SD = 7.89
M = 8.47
SD = 8.53
-.890 .374
Years 
employed in 
EM 
M = 11.09
SD = 9.99
M = 12.36
SD = 9.89
-1.17 .243
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Table 3.2: Results from the t-tests comparing mail and telephone  
respondents for content variables 
 
Variable Mail Telephone 
 
t p
Responsibility M = 31.89
SD = 11.86
M = 35.41
SD = 11.97
-2.740 .006
Capability M = 30.05
SD = 11.75
M = 30.64
SD = 10.77
-.475 .635
Channels employ 
to communicate 
in English 
M = 8.02
SD = 3.80
M = 9.30
SD = 3.99
-3.06 .002*
Channels employ 
to communicate 
in Spanish  
M = 2.73
SD = 2.92
M = 2.74
SD = 3.06
-.034 .973
Total number of 
English-only 
channels 
M = 5.35
SD = 3.52
M = 6.58
SD = 4.52
-2.674 .008
Total number of 
Spanish-only 
channels 
M = .050
SD = .259
M = .034
SD = .182
-.034 .973
Total number of 
channels in both 
languages 
M = 2.68
SD = 2.87
M = 2.72
SD = 3.04
-.129 .897
Total number of 
channels in 
neither language 
M = 6.97
SD = 3.82
M = 5.65
SD = 3.94
3.18 .002*
Who work with  M = 19.48
SD = 12.95
M = 15.45
SD = 15.10
2.56 .011
*t-test is significant   
 
Research question one 
The first research question asks what channels counties employ to communicate disaster 
information in Spanish. Table 3.3 displays the percentages and rankings of the channels 
counties employ to communicate disaster information in English only, Spanish only, both 
77 
languages, and neither language. Hypothesis 1a predicted most counties do not provide 
disaster information in Spanish. Seventy percent of the respondents employ at least one 
channel to communicate Spanish-language disaster information, rejecting hypothesis 1a.  
 
Table 3.3: Percentages and rankings of channels counties employ to communicate disaster 
information in English only, Spanish only, both languages, and neither language* 
 
Channel English Only 
 
Spanish Only 
 
Both 
Languages 
 
Neither 
 
Percent Rank Percent Rank Percent Rank Percent Rank 
Brochures 35% 8 <1% 7 50% 1 14% 14
Disaster 
guides 
37% 7 1% 1 42% 2 21% 13
PSAs 50% 3 <1% 7 21% 5 29% 11
Newsletters 29% 11 <1% 7 9% 11 65% 4
News 
releases 
68% 1 <1% 7 18% 6 13% 15
Magnets 24% 14 <1% 7 4% 14 69% 2
Coloring 
books 
31% 10 1% 1 24% 4 45% 7
Community 
meetings 
61% 2 1% 1 13% 9 25% 12
Church 
meetings 
45% 5 1% 1 15% 8 40% 9
Fact sheets 35% 8 1% 1 27% 3 38% 10
Video news 
releases 
27% 13 1% 1 6% 12 66% 3
Advertising 38% 6 0% 13 11% 10 52% 6
Hotlines 29% 11 <1% 7 18% 6 54% 5
Web page 48% 4 0% 13 8% 13 44% 8
Billboards 11% 15 0% 13 3% 15 86% 1
*Numbers are rounded to the nearest tenth; some rows add up to more than 100%. 
 
However, on average, the counties employ about nine different channels to communicate 
English-language disaster information, but only about three different channels to 
communicate Spanish-language disaster information. Thus, although the majority of the 
counties employ at least one channel to communicate disaster information in Spanish, they 
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employ on average three times more channels to communicate disaster information in 
English than in Spanish. Providing more English-language channels, however, does not 
necessarily mean counties provide higher quality or better disaster information in English. 
 Table 3.3 also ranks the channels counties employ to communicate disaster information 
from most commonly employed to least commonly employed for each of the four language 
categories. All of the two most commonly provided channels are written rather than oral for 
the English-only, both languages, and neither language categories.  
 Examining the percentages of counties that provide each channel in English and/or Spanish 
(displayed in Table 3.4) reveals that counties provide much more oral information in English 
than in Spanish. Seventy-one percent of counties provide PSAs in English, but only 21% 
provide PSAs in Spanish. Seventy-five percent of counties provide community meetings in 
English, but only 14% provide community meetings in Spanish. Sixty percent of counties 
provide church group meetings in English, but only 15% of counties provide church group 
meetings in Spanish. Thirty-four percent of counties provide video news releases in English, 
but only 7% percent provide video news releases in Spanish. Finally, 46% of counties 
provide hotlines in English, but only 18% provide hotlines in Spanish. Table 3.4 also reveals 
that hypothesis 1b is confirmed. Counties employ more channels to communicate written 
information in Spanish than oral information in Spanish.  
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Table 3.4: Percentages of channels counties employ to communicate disaster information in 
English and Spanish 
 
Channel English Spanish 
Percent Percent 
PSA 71% 21%
Community 
meetings 
75% 14%
Church 
meetings 
60% 15%
Video news 
releases 
34% 7%
Hotlines 46% 18%
Advertising 49% 11%
Fact sheets 62% 27%
Web page 57% 8%
Billboards 14% 3%
Brochures 85% 51%
Disaster 
guides 
78% 42%
Newsletters 38% 9%
News 
releases 
86% 18%
Magnets 29% 5%
Coloring 
books 
55% 24%
Research question two 
 
Research question two asks what factors affect the channels counties employ to 
communicate Spanish-language disaster information before, during, and after disasters. I 
conducted a series of Pearson correlations to answer this research question. I found 
significant positive relationships between the number of channels counties employ to 
communicate Spanish-language disaster information for all nine factors tested. The results 
for the correlations are displayed in Table 3.5. 
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Table 3.5: Factors associated with the number of channels counties employ to communicate 
Spanish-language disaster information  
 
Factors r r2 n
Size of county EM 
staff 
.193* .037 433 
Size of county 
Hispanic population 
.232* .054 381 
Level of fiscal 
support provided by 
federal, state, and 
county governments 
.230* .053 430 
Total 
communication 
budget 
.194* .038 265 
Percentage of 
communication 
budget for Spanish-
language 
information 
.442* .195 399 
Number of state 
disasters in past five 
years 
.198* .039 312 
Number of county 
disasters in past five 
years  
.137* .019 400 
Number of Spanish-
speaking employees 
.209* .044 428 
Number of groups 
work with  
.403* .162 435 
*correlation is significant at the .01 level 
 
Hypothesis 2a predicted the larger the county emergency management staff, the greater the 
number of channels counties employ to communicate Spanish-language disaster information. 
The correlation indicated a significant relationship between the size of the staff and the 
number of channels counties employ to communicate Spanish-language disaster information 
(r = .193). According to Cohen (1988), a correlation value between .10 and .29 is small, a 
correlation value between .30 and .49 is medium, and a correlation value between .50 and 1.0 
is large. Thus, the correlation between the size of the county emergency management staff 
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and the channels counties employ to communicate Spanish-language disaster information is 
small. But, the staff size only accounts for 3.7.% (r2 = .037, p = <.0005) of the total variance 
in the number of channels counties employ. On average, the counties have three full-time 
employees (SD = 5.5, range = 0 to 50), one part-time employee (SD = 3.6, range = 0 to 50), 
and 20 volunteers (SD = 50.6, range = 0 to 500). Volunteers include full-time county 
emergency management directors, administrative assistants, and community members who 
help with disaster responses. Twenty-one percent of the survey respondents are part-time 
employees and 75% are full-time. These figures, however, may be misleading given that the 
survey question from which I obtained these data asked whether the respondents were full-
time or part-time employees in their current positions. A better question to ask would have 
been whether the respondents were full or part-time emergency managers.  
 Hypothesis 2b predicted the larger the local Hispanic population, the greater the number of 
channels counties employ to communicate Spanish-language disaster information. The 
correlation indicated a significant positive relationship between the size of the local Hispanic 
population and the number of channels counties employ to communicate Spanish-language 
disaster information (r = .232, p <.0005). This correlation, however, is small by Cohen’s 
(1988) standards. Also, the size of the local Hispanic population only accounts for only 5.4% 
(r2 = .054) of the total variance in the number of channels counties employ to communicate 
Spanish-language disaster information.  
 Hypothesis 2c predicted the more annual fiscal support provided by the federal, state, and 
county governments, the greater the number of channels counties employ to communicate 
Spanish-language disaster information. The correlation confirmed this hypothesis, but the 
relationship between these two variables is small (r = .230, p < .0005). Also, the total fiscal 
82 
support provided by all three levels of government only accounts for 5.3% (r2 = .053) of the 
total variance in the number of channels counties employ to communicate Spanish-language 
disaster information.  
 By dividing the total fiscal support variable into three fiscal support variables, one for each 
level of government, I conducted three additional tests to determine whether fiscal support 
provided by one level of government has a stronger relationship with the number of channels 
counties employ to communicate Spanish-language disaster information. I found that the 
relationship between the level of fiscal support provided by the federal government and the 
number of channels counties employ was the smallest (r = .141, n = 435, p < .0005), 
accounting for only 2% (r2 = .020) of the total variance in the number of channels counties 
employ. The relationship between the level of fiscal support provided by the state 
government and the number of channels counties employ to communicate Spanish-language 
disaster information was slightly stronger (r = .166, n = 431, p < .0005), accounting for 2.8% 
(r2 = .028) of the total variance in the number of channels counties employ. The relationship 
between the level of fiscal support provided by the county government and the number of 
channels counties employ to communicate Spanish-language disaster information was the 
strongest of the three (r = .269, n = 373, p < .0005), accounting for 7.2% (r2 = .072) of the 
total variance in the number of channels counties employ. However, the results from a Fisher 
log z-test, displayed in Table 3.6, indicate that the three correlations are not significantly 
different from one another 
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Table 3.6: Comparison of correlations between government fiscal support and channels 
counties employ to communicate Spanish-language disaster information 
 
Correlation comparison z p
Level of fiscal support provided by federal government to state 
government 
-.38 .71 
Level of fiscal support provided by federal government to county 
government 
-1.96 .05 
Level of fiscal support provided by state government to county 
government 
-1.58 .11 
Examining the relationship between the counties’ total public communication budgets and 
the number of channels counties employ to communicate Spanish-language disaster 
information, I found a small positive correlation (r = .194, p < .0005), accounting for 3.8% 
(r2 = .038) of the total variance in the number of channels counties employ. The average 
public communication budget for the counties is about $287, ranging from zero dollars (n =
175) to $10,550 (n = 1).  About 40% of the counties did not answer this question, indicating 
they may not have a direct line item in their budget for communication. Or, the respondents 
representing these counties may not have provided this information because they thought it 
was sensitive.    
 I found a larger correlation between the percentage of the public communication budget 
dedicated to Spanish-language information and the number of channels counties employ to 
communicate Spanish-language disaster information (r = .442, p < .0005). By Cohen’s (1988) 
standards, this correlation is considered medium. The percentage of the public 
communication budget dedicated to Spanish-language information accounts for 19.5% (r2
= .195) of the total variance in the number of channels counties employ to communicate 
Spanish-language disaster information. Of the counties that have a communication budget, 
about 66% of them dedicate 0% of this budget to Spanish-language disaster information. The 
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remaining 34% spend between 1% to 100% of their total communication budget on Spanish-
language disaster information (M = 6%). 
 Hypothesis 2d predicted the larger the average number of disasters experienced in the 
state and county, the greater the number of channels counties employ to communicate 
Spanish-language disaster information. A small positive relationship was found between the 
number of state disasters experienced and the number of channels counties employ to 
communicate Spanish-language disaster information (r  = .198, p < .0005). The number of 
state disasters experienced only accounts for 3.9% (r2 = .039) of the total variance in the 
number of channels counties employ. A slightly smaller correlation was found between the 
number of county disasters experienced and the number of channels counties employ to 
communicate Spanish-language disaster information (r = .137, p < .0005). This correlation, 
however, also is small. The number of county disasters experienced only accounts for 1.9% 
(r2 = .019) of the total variance in the number of channels counties employ. 
 Hypothesis 2e predicted the larger the number of Spanish-speaking employees the county 
has, the greater the number of channels counties employ to communicate Spanish-language 
disaster information. A small positive relationship was found for this hypothesis (r = .209, p
< .0005), accounting for 4.4% (r2 = .044) of the total variance in the number of channels 
counties employ to communicate Spanish-language disaster information. Only 29% of the 
counties have at least one employee or volunteer who speaks Spanish. However, 53% of the 
counties have access to at least one Spanish-speaker for disaster planning, 63% have access 
to at least one Spanish-speaker for disaster response, and 62% have access to at least one 
Spanish-speaker for disaster recovery.  
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 Hypothesis 2f predicted the more groups counties work with to provide disaster 
information in Spanish, the greater the number of channels counties employ to communicate 
Spanish-language disaster information. A medium positive relationship was found for this 
hypothesis (r = .404, p < .0005). The number of groups counties work with to provide 
Spanish-disaster information accounted for 16.2% (r2 = .162) of the total variance in the 
number of channels counties employ to communicate Spanish-language disaster information. 
 Finally, to definitively determine which of the factors I tested has the strongest relationship 
with the number of channels counties employ to communicate Spanish-language disaster 
information, I conducted a Fisher’s log z-test. This test compared the size of the correlations 
for the two factors that have the strongest relationship with the number of channels counties 
employ: percentage of communication budget for Spanish-language information and the 
number of groups counties work with to provide Spanish-language information. The results 
for the z-test indicate that the two correlations are not significantly different (z = .683, p
=.49 ).  
 
Research question three 
 The first part of research question three asks how often county emergency management 
directors work with various governmental and nongovernmental groups listed to provide 
disaster information in Spanish. Table 3.7 presents the findings. In general, directors work 
with all 13 groups to provide Spanish-language disaster information, but only on a limited 
basis as evidenced by the low median and mean scores. Directors work most often with state 
emergency management agencies, FEMA and/or the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), employees from other county emergency management agencies, county agencies 
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other than emergency management, state agencies other than emergency management, and 
volunteer organizations active in disasters (VOAD).  
 
Table 3.7: How often county emergency management directors work with specific groups to 
provide Spanish-language disaster information* 
 
Group N/A 
(0) 
Not 
often 
(1)  
2 3 4 Very 
often 
(5) 
Median M SD
State EMA 20% 32% 10% 14% 10% 14% 1.00 2.04 1.72
FEMA/DHS 20% 41% 12% 11% 6% 10% 1.00 1.72 1.54
County 
agencies other 
than EM 
25% 35% 11% 12% 10% 8% 1.00 1.69 1.57
Employees 
from other 
county EMA 
27% 36% 14% 8% 10% 6% 1.00 1.55 1.50
State agencies 
other than EM 
25% 36% 16% 12% 7% 5% 1.00 1.54 1.41
VOAD 28% 37% 13% 13% 6% 3% 1.00 1.43 1.34
City mayors 30% 41% 10% 9% 7% 3% 1.00 1.33 1.36
Governor 28% 44% 10% 8% 5% 4% 1.00 1.32 1.34
City EMs 35% 38% 9% 9% 4% 4% 1.00 1.21 1.34
Local 
religious 
organizations 
32% 39% 13% 9% 5% 3% 1.00 1.23 1.26
Local ethnic 
organizations 
35% 35% 15% 8% 4% 3% 1.00 1.19 1.27
Private sector 
organizations 
35% 40% 11% 8% 3% 2% 1.00 1.12 1.20
State 
legislators 
35% 46% 9% 6% 3% 2% 1.00 1.02 1.11
*Frequencies are rounded to the nearest tenth; some rows add up to more than 100%. 
Directors work least often with city mayors, governors, city emergency managers, local 
religious organizations, local ethnic organizations, private sector organizations, and state 
legislators. It is important to note, however, that a large percentage of the directors do not 
work at all with each of the groups. In addition, there is a lot of variance in how often 
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directors work with the groups as evidenced by the relatively large standard deviations for 
each group.   
 The second part of research question three asks do county emergency management 
directors work most with the groups before, during, and/or after disasters to provide disaster 
information in Spanish. Table 3.8 displays the results. In general the percentages of when 
directors work with the groups are relatively consistent for before, during, and after disasters. 
This means that if directors work with these groups, they tend to work with them equally 
before, during, and after disasters. One notable exception to this rule is FEMA/DHS. About 
39% of the directors work with FEMA/DHS before disasters, 35% work with FEMA/DHS 
during disasters, and 49% work with FEMA/DHS after disasters. Thus, directors tend to 
work much more with FEMA after disasters than before and during disasters. It is important 
to note, however, that the majority of the directors indicated they did not work with these 
groups at all before, during, and after disasters.  
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Table 3.8: Disaster phase when county emergency management directors work with groups 
to provide Spanish-language disaster information 
 
Group Before Crises During 
Crises 
After 
Crises 
Percent n Percent n Percent n
FEMA/DHS 
 
39 170 35 152 49 213
SEMA 
 
51 222 48 209 48 209
State agencies other 
than EM 
 
39 169 35 152 37 161
Governor 
 
28 121 26 113 34 148
State legislators 
 
23 100 18 78 29 126
Employees from 
other county EMAs 
 
40 174 35 152 36 157
County agencies 
other than EM 
 
43 187 38 165 39 170
City mayors 
 
40 174 36 157 34 146
City emergency 
managers 
 
33 143 27 117 27 117
VOAD 33 144 30 131 33 144
Local ethnic 
organizations 
 
23 100 20 87 23 100
Local religious 
organizations 
 
29 126 24 104 28 122
Private sector 
organizations 
 
27 117 24 104 25 109
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Research question four 
 Research question four asks who county emergency management directors believe should 
be responsible for producing disaster information in Spanish. Table 3.9 summarizes how the 
directors rated each group and displays the medians, means, and standard deviations for each 
group’s overall rating. Examining the medians and means displayed in Table 3.9, there is a 
clear downward trend from the federal to state to local governments in terms of who directors 
believe should be responsible for producing disaster information in Spanish. This means that 
directors believe FEMA/DHS has the highest responsibility, followed by the state emergency 
management agency, governor’s office, local ethnic groups, and state agencies other than 
emergency management. Likewise, county emergency management agencies and other 
county agencies are viewed as more responsible than city mayors. Interestingly, local ethnic 
organizations, volunteer organizations active in disasters, and local religious organizations all 
have higher means and medians than do local government groups. This finding means that 
directors believe nongovernmental groups are more responsible for producing Spanish-
language disaster information than local governments. It is important to note, however, that 
there is a lot of variance in how directors rated the groups as evidenced by the relatively large 
standard deviations.      
 
Table 3.9: Who county emergency management directors believe should be responsible for producing
Spanish-language disaster information
Group N/A
(0)
Low
responsibility
(1)
2 3 4 High
responsibility
(5)
Median Mean SD
FEMA/DHS 4% 2% 3% 10% 14% 68% 5 4.30 1.28
State EMA 3% 5% 4% 18% 28% 43% 4 3.91 1.28
Governor 9% 13% 10% 18% 20% 31% 4 3.20 1.67
Local ethnic
organizations
13% 9% 11% 19% 21% 26% 3 3.04 1.71
State agencies
other than EM
10% 13% 12% 26% 20% 20% 3 2.92 1.58
Volunteer
organizations
active in disasters
15% 18% 13% 25% 15% 15% 3 2.53 1.64
Local religious
organizations
12% 25% 21% 24% 9% 10% 2 2.25 1.47
County agencies
other than EM
11% 29% 19% 22% 12% 8% 2 2.20 1.45
City emergency
managers
18% 25% 14% 21% 12% 12% 2 2.20 1.62
Employees from
county EMAs
12% 32% 16% 23% 7% 11% 2 2.15 1.51
Private sector
organizations
12% 29% 19% 23% 9% 9% 2 2.12 1.45
City mayors 14% 32% 17% 20% 8% 9% 2 2.04 1.49
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Research question five 
 
Research question five asks how capable do county emergency management directors 
believe various governmental and nongovernmental groups are of producing high quality 
disaster information in Spanish. Table 3.10 summarizes the results. Once again, there is a 
downward trend from federal government to local government in how capable the managers 
think the groups are of producing high quality Spanish-language disaster information. 
FEMA/DHS received the highest mean and median capability scores, followed by the state, 
county, and city groups. Interestingly, the nongovernmental groups (volunteer organizations 
active in disasters, local ethnic organizations, local religious organizations, and private sector 
organizations) received higher capability scores than the local government groups. It is 
important to note, however, that there is a lot of variability in how directors scored these 
groups as evidenced by the relatively large standard deviations and the differences exhibited 
in the mean and median values. 
 
Table 3.10: How capable county emergency management directors believe groups are of producing
Spanish-language disaster information
Group N/A
(0)
Low
Capability
(1)
2 3 4 High
Capability
(5)
Median Mean SD
FEMA/DHS 5% 5% 4% 13% 18% 56% 5 4.00 1.42
State EMA 5% 5% 6% 20% 28% 35% 4 3.66 1.42
State agencies
other than EM
9% 13% 13% 30% 17% 19% 3 2.88 1.54
Governors 9% 10% 14% 22% 18% 27% 3 3.11 1.61
Local ethnic
organizations
15% 15% 14% 21% 15% 21% 3 2.68 1.73
Volunteer
organizations
active in
disasters
14% 20% 19% 28% 10% 10% 2 2.30 1.49
Local religious
organizations
13% 25% 22% 24% 7% 9% 2 2.14 1.44
County EMA 12% 29% 22% 23% 9% 6% 2 2.06 1.37
Private sector
organizations
16% 28% 20% 21% 8% 7% 2 1.98 1.44
County agencies
other than EM
12% 32% 24% 22% 8% 3% 2 1.90 1.26
City emergency
managers
19% 32% 19% 17% 6% 7% 1 1.80 1.43
City mayors 14% 43% 21% 15% 5% 4% 1 1.67 1.25
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Summary 
 The analyses of the survey data found that most counties (70%) employ at least one 
channel to communicate Spanish-language disaster information. Counties, however, employ 
on average three times more channels to communicate English-language disaster information 
than channels to communicate Spanish-language disaster information. Providing more 
English-language channels, however, does not necessarily mean counties provide higher 
quality or better disaster information in English. Counties also provide more written than oral 
Spanish-language disaster channels. Thus, hypothesis 1a, the prediction that most counties 
would not provide Spanish-language disaster information, was not confirmed. However, 
hypothesis 1b, the prediction that the counties would provide more written than oral Spanish-
language disaster information, was confirmed.   
 Hypotheses 2a through 2f also were confirmed. I found significant positive relationships 
between how much Spanish-language disaster information counties provide and the size of 
the county emergency management staff; the size of the local Hispanic population; the fiscal 
support provided by federal, state and county governments; the average number of disasters 
experienced in the county and state; and the number of groups counties work with to provide 
Spanish-language disaster information. Only two of these correlations, however, yielded 
positive medium values (r = .30 to .49): working with groups and percentage of the 
communication budget dedicated to Spanish-language information. Working with groups 
accounted for 16.2% (r2 = .162) of the total variance in how many channels counties employ 
to communicate Spanish-language disaster information. Percentage of the communication 
budget dedicated to Spanish-language information accounted for 19.5% (r2 = .195) of the 
variance in how many channels counties employ to communicate Spanish-language disaster 
94 
information. The other four correlations yielded small positive correlation values (r = .10
to .29) and accounted for very little of the variance in how many channels counties employ to 
communicate Spanish-language disaster information (1.9% to 5.4%). 
 Examining how often county emergency management directors work with various groups 
to provide Spanish-language disaster information, I found that directors work with all 13 of 
the groups tested, but only on a limited basis. Directors work most often with FEMA/DHS 
and state emergency management agencies and least often with city mayors, governors, city 
emergency managers, local religious organizations, local ethnic organizations, private sector 
organizations, and state legislators. A sizeable proportion of directors do not work at all with 
these groups. Directors that work with these groups work consistently with them before, 
during, and after disasters to provide Spanish-language disaster information. One major 
exception to this finding is FEMA/DHS; directors work much more often with FEMA/DHS 
after disasters than before and during disasters. 
 Examining who directors think should be responsible for producing Spanish-language 
disaster information, there is a clear downward trend from federal to state to local 
government. Directors think FEMA/DHS followed by the state emergency management 
agencies are the most responsible for providing Spanish-language disaster information and 
local governments are the least responsible for providing Spanish-language disaster 
information. Non-governmental groups (volunteer organizations active in disasters, private 
sector organizations, local religious groups, and local ethnic groups) fall in the middle–they 
are perceived as more responsible than local government, but less responsible than the 
federal and state governments.  
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 Finally, examining who directors believe is most capable of producing Spanish-language 
disaster information, there also is a clear downward trend from federal to state to local 
government. Directors also rank non-governmental groups as more capable than local 
government, but less capable than the federal and state governments.  
 In the next chapter, I discuss the limitations of the interview and survey data and the major 
implications of the survey and interview findings, both practical and theoretical. The chapter 
concludes with what the findings mean for how best to communicate Spanish-language 
disaster information.  
Chapter Four: Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Before any conclusions can be made, it is imperative to discuss the limitations of the study. 
First, as already noted, the interviews provide many interesting findings but because these 
finding are qualitative the interview data are not generalizable. Second, the relatively low 
response rate from the survey (31%) means that I must be cautious when making 
generalizations to the entire population. In addition, because there is a lot of variability in the 
population of county emergency management agencies, as evidenced by the relatively large 
standard deviations scores my sample displayed, definitive statements about the population 
must also be viewed with some caution. Nevertheless, both the interviews and survey data 
provide many interesting insights that can inform both practice and theory when these 
limitations are taken into account. 
 
Optimizing data collection with emergency managers 
 
The high response rate from the telephone survey administration (62.9%) compared to the 
relatively low response rate from the mail survey administration (22.7%) indicates this 
population is much more responsive to telephone than mail surveys. Because most of the 
county emergency managers have small staffs (on average three full-time employees, one 
part-time employee, and 20 volunteers), it is likely they are willing to participate in research 
but are so busy that they need the extra push of a personal phone call to motivate them to 
participate. Overall, however, this population seems interested in research, probably because 
emergency management has only recently become an academic research topic. In addition, 
this population is interested in research that can help improve their job performance. I 
received 10 phone calls and multiple emails from the mail survey respondents asking for 
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resources to help them better provide Spanish-language disaster information. Most of these 
respondents also asked if I would be conducting further research in this area or on other 
language minorities. Two respondents invited me to speak at local conferences and more than 
20 respondents included personal business cards with their survey responses, inviting me to 
contact them with any questions. Thus, it seems like this research area has a lot of potential 
to meaningfully affect how emergency managers communicate with Hispanics and other 
special-needs populations.    
 
The number of channels states and counties employ to communicate Spanish-language 
disaster information 
 
One of the goals of this dissertation was to provide a baseline of how much Spanish-
language disaster information states and counties provide. From the 13 interviews, I found 
most of the states represented in the interviews do not provide very much Spanish-language 
disaster information. This finding was surprising given that all the communicators I 
interviewed either represented states with one of the 10 largest Hispanic populations or one 
of the 10 quickest growing Hispanic populations in the country. From the survey of county 
emergency management directors, I found 70% of the responding counties employ at least 
one channel to communicate Spanish-language disaster information, but the responding 
counties employ almost three times more channels to communicate English-language disaster 
information than to communicate Spanish-language disaster information. Thus, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the counties employ more channels to communicate Spanish-
language disaster information than the states do. But overall, states and counties employ 
significantly fewer channels to communicate disaster information in Spanish than in English. 
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Providing more English-language channels, however, does not necessarily mean counties 
provide higher quality or better English-language disaster information.  
 It also is important to note that the states and counties that participated in my research 
employ more written than oral channels to communicate Spanish-language disaster 
information. As the literature review revealed, Hispanics are more responsive to oral rather 
than print information (Marin & Marin, 1991). Thus, these states and counties would be more 
effective communicating disaster information to Spanish speakers if they provided more 
information orally. Interestingly, most of the counties surveyed provide oral information 
(community meetings, church meetings, video news releases, hotlines, and public service 
announcements) in English, but not in Spanish. This means that the surveyed counties have 
the necessary skills and networks to provide oral information in English. Thus, the counties 
also should have the skills to provide this same information in Spanish if they develop 
networks with Hispanic community groups and churches. Such networks also would provide 
these counties with access to more Spanish-speakers who could help develop public service 
announcements, lead community meetings, and develop other community-specific Spanish-
language information. Greater access to Spanish-speakers is especially important given that 
only 29% of the survey respondents have at least one employee or volunteer who speaks 
Spanish. And, the Spanish-language material provided by FEMA and the American Red 
Cross are not community-specific.  
 Although it is important to document the channels counties and states employ to 
communicate disaster information in Spanish, it is even more important to document how 
states and counties distribute this information. If states and counties employ a lot of channels 
to communicate Spanish-language disaster information, but do not distribute this information, 
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then the number of channels counties employ is meaningless. From the interviews, I found 
that the states believe counties are responsible for developing and distributing Spanish-
language disaster information to the public. Thus, in general, the states do not directly 
produce nor distribute Spanish-language disaster information to the public. The survey did 
not ask how counties distribute disaster information to Hispanics. One county emergency 
manager from Florida, however, called me to ask whether he should mark on the survey all 
of the Spanish-language channels his county employs given that his agency does not 
distribute this information at all. Future research needs to investigate how, if at all, counties 
distribute Spanish-language disaster information.  
 Another missing variable from both the interview and survey data is the quality of 
Spanish-language disaster information the states and counties provide. While it is important 
to know how much Spanish-language information they provide, if this information is poorly 
translated or poorly produced, its usefulness is weakened.  
 Initial anecdotal evidence suggests there is a wide variety in the quality of Spanish-
language disaster information counties provide. The survey mail respondents had the option 
of including examples of Spanish-language disaster information they provide in the pre-paid 
envelope with their survey. Only 19 respondents included such information. Most of the 
information the counties mailed were FEMA and American Red Cross brochures and disaster 
guides (n = 30). I also received two FEMA coloring books. In addition, three counties mailed 
brochures and disaster guides developed by their county emergency management agencies; 
one county mailed a disaster pocket guide created by the county department of health 
services; one county mailed a flyer created by the county emergency management agency; 
and one county mailed a magnet that displayed the county emergency management agency’s 
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contact information. However, it is clear that among these 19 counties there is a wide range 
in quality of the Spanish-language disaster information they provide. Some of the 
information appears to be professionally produced, especially the information developed by 
FEMA and the American Red Cross. Conversely, some of the information appears to be less 
sophisticated, especially the information developed by the counties. 
 
Factors that affect the number of channels counties employ to communicate Spanish-
language disaster information 
 
To determine what factors affect the number of channels counties employ to communicate 
Spanish-language disaster information, the survey tested relationships between the following 
nine factors and the variety of channels: size of county emergency management staff; size of 
county Hispanic population; level of fiscal support provided by federal, state and county 
governments; total public communication budget; percentage of public communication 
budget dedicated to Spanish-language disaster information; number of state and county 
disasters in past five years; number of Spanish-speaking employees; and number of groups 
counties work with to provide Spanish-language disaster information. As predicted, I found 
significant positive Pearson correlations for all of these factors. None of the factors, however, 
are highly correlated with the variety of channels counties employ to communicate Spanish-
language disaster information. Also, most of the factors account for very little of the total 
variance in the number of the channels counties employ to communicate Spanish-language 
disaster information. 
 Seven of these nine factors have only a small relationship with the number of channels 
counties employ to communicate Spanish-language disaster information (r = .137 to .232). 
The percentage of the public communication budget dedicated to Spanish-language 
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information has the largest relationship with the number of channels counties employ, with a 
medium correlation value (r = .442). This percentage accounts for 19.5% of the total variance 
in the number of channels counties employ to communicate Spanish-language disaster 
information (19.5%). The data collected on the percentage of the public communication 
budget dedicated to Spanish-language information, however, may be misleading. 
Approximately 39% of the respondents did not report their total public communication 
budget, but only about 8% of the respondents did not report the percentage of their total 
communication budget dedicated toward Spanish-language information. Thus, it is possible 
the respondents did not know their total communication budget, thereby making the Spanish-
language percentages they supplied suspect. Conversely, respondents may not have reported 
their total communication budgets because they did not want to make their budgets public 
knowledge. 
 The relationship between the number of groups counties work with to provide Spanish-
language disaster information and the number of channels counties employ to communicate 
Spanish-language disaster information also produced a medium correlation value (r = .403), 
accounting for 16.2% (16.2%) of the total variance in the number of channels counties 
employ to communicate Spanish-language disaster information. Although the correlation 
value for the percentage of the public communication budget dedicated to Spanish-language 
information was slightly larger than the correlation value for the number of groups counties 
work with, the results from a Fisher’s log z-test indicate there is no statistically significant 
difference in the size of these two correlations (z = .683, p = .49). This finding provides 
evidence to support the application of principal-agent theory to emergency management 
research.  
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 Principal-agent theory suggests that intergovernmental relationships affect how policy 
issues are developed and implemented. The findings from the correlations indicate that 
working with governmental and nongovernmental groups and the size of the Spanish- 
language communication budget, rather than the other factors I tested, have the strongest 
connection with the number of channels counties employ to communicate Spanish-language 
disaster information. Since correlations do not provide evidence of causality, however, it is 
not possible to conclude that working with groups and having a large Spanish-language 
disaster communicate budget causes counties to employ more Spanish-language disaster 
communication channels. Nevertheless, the correlations provide at least initial evidence that 
principal-agent theory can help explain the number of channels counties employ to 
communicate Spanish-language disaster information because relationships (working with 
groups) has one of the strongest relationships with the number of channels counties employ 
to communicate Spanish-language disaster information. 
 The logical next question to consider answering is whether there are factors that have 
stronger relationships with the number of channels counties employ to Spanish-language 
disaster information than the factors I tested. It is important to investigate whether other 
factors would produce stronger correlation values than the factors I tested to continue 
evaluating whether principal-agent theory provides the best theoretical explanation. Other 
factors that might explain what drives county emergency managers to provide Spanish-
language disaster information include whether county emergency management directors have 
a public information officer on staff; the directors’ level of public relations expertise and 
experience; how important directors think it is to provide Spanish-language disaster 
information; and how much Spanish-language disaster information the state or federal 
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governments automatically send to directors versus how much information these directors 
have to seek out themselves.   
 
Who SEMA communicators and county emergency management directors work with to 
provide Spanish-language disaster information 
 
The interviews revealed that SEMA communicators who provide Spanish-language 
disaster information do so through working with various groups including the American Red 
Cross, local ethnic organizations, local religious organizations, counties, and cities. Likewise, 
the survey findings indicate that county emergency management directors sometimes work 
with these same groups in addition to state agencies, state legislators, and private sector 
organizations to provide Spanish-language disaster information. County emergency 
management directors work most often with their state emergency management agency, 
FEMA/DHS, county agencies, and volunteer organizations active in disasters (VOADs) to 
provide Spanish-language disaster information. Directors work least often with city groups, 
local religious and ethnic groups, and private sector organizations to provide Spanish-
language disaster information. Thus, there appears to be a downward trend from federal to 
state to local government in terms of how often directors work with various levels of 
government to provide Spanish-language disaster information.  
 County emergency management directors may work most often with state and federal 
agencies and VOADs because these organizations provide the managers with free disaster 
support materials. These groups also are easy to identify. Conversely, city groups, local 
religious and ethnic groups, and private sector groups are not as likely to provide directors 
with support materials. Thus, there is less of an obvious incentive for directors to work with 
these groups. Also, local religious, local ethnic, and private sector groups are harder to 
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identify than government groups. Thus, directors may not have the time to actively form 
partnerships with these nongovernmental groups. Finally, it is possible that directors do not 
work often with religious groups because these directors believe in a separation of church 
and state.  
 However, since directors display a large variance in how they rate these groups (as 
evidenced by the large standard deviations for each group’s mean score), it is not possible to 
conclude which groups directors work with most often to provide Spanish-language disaster 
information. This large variation, however, does lead to the conclusion that there is no 
standard system for obtaining Spanish-language disaster information. Just like SEMA 
communicators, directors do not converge on working most often with the same groups to 
provide Spanish-language disaster information. Thus, either no groups have identified 
themselves as leaders in providing Spanish-language disaster information or, more likely, 
county emergency management directors are not aware of the resources select groups can 
provide. Since FEMA and the American Red Cross provide an extensive variety of free 
Spanish-language disaster information online and in print, it is reasonable to assume that 
these two groups are leaders in providing Spanish-language disaster information. Both the 
state communicators I interviewed and the county emergency management directors I 
surveyed, however, clearly do not identify FEMA and the American Red Cross (a VOAD) as 
the primary groups they work with to provide Spanish-language disaster information. Future 
research needs to explore why SEMA communicators and county directors do not identify 
FEMA and the American Red Cross as leaders in providing Spanish-language disaster 
information and do not work with them more frequently.     
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 It also is important to note that a sizeable percentage of county emergency management 
directors do not work with the 13 groups I tested at all (ranging from 20% to 35% of 
directors not working with each group). This finding is important because out of all the 
factors I tested, working with groups has one of the strongest relationship with the variety of 
channels counties employ to communicate Spanish-language disaster information. Thus, it is 
possible that if directors do not work with any groups, they are much less likely to provide 
Spanish-language disaster information. 
 The theoretical implication of the finding that SEMA communicators and county directors 
do not work consistently with the same groups to provide Spanish-language disaster 
information is that the potential for information-asymmetry increases among the federal, state, 
and local emergency management agencies. As defined by principal-agent theory, 
information asymmetry exists when principals and agents possess different information about 
a policy issue. Information asymmetry can be problematic because principals frequently 
believe agents should be responsible for addressing policy issues (because agents are closer 
to the people these issues affect), but principals often do not have a system to monitor how 
agents address the issues. Thus, agents have the opportunity to shirk from their 
responsibilities by not adequately resolving a policy issue or passing the issue onto another 
agent to resolve. Because principals do not have a system to monitor agents’ activities, these 
principals are not aware when agents shirk (if at all).  
 For this dissertation, information asymmetry exists when principals expect agents to 
provide Spanish-language disaster information but do not monitor whether the agents 
actually provide this information. One form of monitoring is having a clear channel through 
which principals and agents communicate about how best to provide Spanish-language 
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disaster information. I measured the existence of such a channel when asking the SEMA 
communicators and county emergency management directors who they work with to provide 
Spanish-language disaster information. Because I found inconsistency in whom the SEMA 
communicators and county directors work with, I conclude there is not a clear channel 
through which principals and agents communicate with each other. Thus, it appears that 
SEMA communicators and county directors have an opportunity to shirk by either passing on 
the responsibility of providing Spanish-language disaster information to another agent or 
simply not providing sufficient Spanish-language disaster information. This is an important 
finding because when SEMA communicators and county directors shirk, the end result is 
Hispanics who only speak Spanish are much less likely to know how to prepare for, respond 
to, and recover form disasters in an unfamiliar country. This finding also is important 
theoretically because it supports the application of principal-agent theory to public sector 
crisis communication research, providing a new perspective on why public sector 
organizations may fail to properly manage crises. This theoretical finding is discussed in 
greater detail later in this chapter.  
 
Who should be responsible for producing Spanish-language disaster information 
 
State communicators and county directors both believe they are not primarily responsible 
for producing Spanish-language disaster information. The state communicators all agreed 
that local emergency managers are responsible for providing Spanish-language disaster 
information. Interestingly, the county directors rated local government as the least 
responsible for providing Spanish-language disaster information. These directors believe 
FEMA/DHS is most responsible, followed by the state government. In fact, county 
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emergency management directors believe volunteer organizations active in disasters and 
local religious and ethnic organizations are more responsible than local governments for 
producing Spanish-language disaster information. It is important, to note, however, that there 
is a lot of variability in how directors scored each of the groups. But, even accounting for this 
variability, directors still rate FEMA/DHS and the states as having more responsibility than 
local emergency managers. In addition, looking at how often directors scored FEMA/DHS 
and the state emergency management agency with the highest responsibility (68% and 42%, 
respectively) further highlights that directors consider these two groups the most responsible 
compared to the other groups.  
 Thus, there is strong evidence that a goal conflict exists between the state and county 
emergency management representatives as to who is responsible for providing Spanish-
language disaster information. According to principal-agent theory, goal conflict emerges 
when principals and agents do not agree on how to address a policy issue. When a goal 
conflict emerges, agents have the opportunity to shirk by not fully addressing the policy issue 
or passing responsibility for addressing the issue to another agent. Conversely, agents can 
pursue their own policy interests, which may run counter to the principals’ interests. The 
state emergency management agencies shirk by only producing a limited number of Spanish-
language channels and passing the responsibility for producing Spanish-language disaster 
information off to county emergency managers. Likewise, county emergency management 
directors shirk by passing the same responsibility off to anyone but themselves and city 
emergency managers. The implication of this goal conflict is that since no one is taking 
responsibility for producing Spanish-language disaster information, little Spanish-language 
disaster information is being produced at the state and county levels.         
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Who is most capable of producing Spanish-language disaster information 
 
County emergency management directors believe that FEMA/DHS is most capable of 
producing Spanish-language disaster information. Directors rate state agencies and their 
governor as the next most capable, followed by non-governmental groups (volunteer 
organizations active in disasters, ethnic and religious groups, and private sector 
organizations). County and city government groups, including emergency management, 
receive the lowest capability scores. Again, the variability in these scores makes it difficult to 
derive concrete conclusions. However, looking at how many directors scored each of the 
groups as highly capable, FEMA/DHS and state emergency management agencies clearly 
emerge as the top two groups that directors believe are the most capable of producing 
Spanish-language disaster information (56% scored FEMA/DHS as highly capable and 35% 
scored SEMAs as highly capable). Conversely, city mayors and county agencies other than 
emergency management emerge as the top two groups that directors believe are least capable 
of producing Spanish language disaster information (4% scored city mayors as highly 
capable and 3% scored county agencies other than emergency management as highly 
capable). These findings mirror the findings about who county emergency management 
directors  believe should be responsible for producing Spanish-language disaster information, 
at least partially explaining why directors rated these groups on their respective responsibility 
levels.  
 It is interesting that directors scored FEMA/DHS as the most responsible for providing 
Spanish-language disaster information and the most capable of providing Spanish-language 
disaster information, but most of the SEMA communicators described FEMA/DHS as a 
necessary evil. The state communicators knew they had to interact with FEMA/DHS, 
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especially after disasters, but for the most part found these interactions to be painful and 
inefficient. Although it is impossible to know what county emergency management directors 
think of their interactions with FEMA/DHS from the quantitative data I collected, it is 
possible to conclude that many more of the county directors work with FEMA/DHS after 
disasters (49%) to provide Spanish-language disaster information than work with 
FEMA/DHS before (39%) and during (35%) disasters. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that 
states and counties are not taking full advantage of the free Spanish-language disaster 
resources FEMA/DHS provides before disasters occur. This conclusion provides additional 
evidence that information asymmetry exists between FEMA and the state county emergency 
management agencies because the states and counties mostly are in contact with FEMA/DHS 
only during and after disasters occur. 
 
Next steps: Future research directions 
 
Results from the interviews and survey leave many questions unanswered, questions that 
should be addressed by future research. First, interviews should be conducted with county 
emergency management directors to identify what factors, other than the ones tested in the 
survey, affect the variety of channels counties employ to communicate Spanish-language 
disaster information. Potential untested factors include whether county emergency 
management directors have a public information officer on staff; the directors’ level of public 
relations expertise and experience; how important directors think it is to provide Spanish-
language disaster information; and how much Spanish-language disaster information the state 
or federal governments automatically send to directors versus how much information these 
directors have to seek out themselves. These interviews also should examine how county 
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emergency management directors distribute Spanish-language disaster information that they 
provide and from what groups directors obtain Spanish-language disaster information. 
Finally, these interviews should explore why some directors shirk their responsibility of 
providing Spanish-language disaster information and others do not. Legitimacy gap theory 
may add insight into why public servants shirk. The theory explains discrepancies in an 
organization’s behavior and society’s expectations of that organization (Bridges, 2004). 
Legitimacy gap theory identifies three organizational responsibilities that motivate behavior: 
legal, economic, and moral. It is possible that these same responsibilities determine whether 
public servants shirk their responsibilities.   
 Second, interviews should be conducted with the FEMA/DHS and American Red Cross 
officials responsible for developing and distributing Spanish-language disaster information. 
These interviews should examine who FEMA/DHS and the Red Cross officials think should 
be responsible for developing and providing Spanish-language disaster information. This 
information is important because thus far I have tested principal-agent theory at the state and 
local levels but have not tested the theory at the federal level. Thus, my analysis is missing a 
key principal, FEMA, in the disaster system. Also, it is important to understand the Red 
Cross’s perspective because it is a potentially influential nongovernmental group that thus far 
appears to be treated as an untapped resource by the state and local governments. These 
interviews should examine how FEMA/DHS and the Red Cross distribute Spanish-language 
disaster information and specifically how they interact with state and county officials. This 
information is important because so far my data indicate that the states and counties are not 
interacting frequently with FEMA/DHS and the Red Cross.     
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 Third, interviews should be conducted with Hispanic disaster survivors to assess how 
effective all levels of government are at communicating with Hispanics before, during, and 
after disasters. Thus far, my research has examined only the management side of disasters 
and has not addressed the audience side. Through addressing the audience side researchers 
will be able to better assess the quality of Spanish-language information provided by 
governmental and nongovernmental groups before, during, and after a specific disaster 
occurs. These interview should focus on how the Hispanic disaster survivors received 
information about the disaster before, during, and after the disaster occurred and how the 
survivors perceive their interactions with governmental and nongovernmental groups before, 
during, and after the disaster occurred. These interviews also should examine the awareness-
attitude-behavior chain, the likelihood that having access to more Spanish-language disaster 
information affects Hispanics’ attitudes about disasters and behaviors before, during, and 
after disasters. 
 Fourth, a survey of members of all groups active in providing Spanish-language disaster 
information should be conducted to further test the applicability of principal-agent theory to 
emergency management research. The findings from the dissertation research and the 
proposed additional interviews would help inform the development of the questionnaire for 
this survey. The results of this proposed survey would provide a complete picture of who the 
primary players in the intergovernmental system believe is responsible for producing and 
providing Spanish-language disaster information, as well as how often these groups interact 
with each other. These data would provide a comprehensive test for the applicability of 
principal-agent theory to the world of emergency management communication. 
112 
 Fifth, a content analysis should be conducted to evaluate the quality of the Spanish-
language materials provided by all levels of government and volunteer organizations active 
in disasters. It is important to evaluate the quality of these materials to understand how 
effective these materials are in communicating disaster information to Spanish-speakers. It 
also is important to evaluate the quality of materials produced at various levels of 
government to determine who is best equipped to produce disaster information in Spanish. 
 
Putting it all together: Implications for how to best communicate Spanish-language  
disaster information 
 
First and foremost, at least one group needs to take responsibility for producing and 
providing Spanish-language disaster information, thereby eliminating the goal conflict I 
found between the state emergency management communicators and county emergency 
management directors. The state emergency management communicators I interviewed 
stated that counties primarily are responsible for producing and providing Spanish-language 
disaster information. Conversely, the county emergency management directors I surveyed 
stated that FEMA/DHS and the state emergency management agencies primarily are 
responsible for producing Spanish-language disaster information. Because both 
representatives from the states and counties deny responsibility for producing and providing 
Spanish-language disaster information, it appears a policy vacuum exists for this issue. 
Downs (1967) conceptualized the idea of a policy space, in which interdependent 
governmental organizations interact to provide social functions, such as Spanish-language 
disaster information. In this policy space, organizations struggle to exert influence over the 
other organizations. In the case of producing and providing Spanish-language disaster 
information, states and counties predominately do not interact to provide Spanish-language 
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disaster information. Therefore, the converse of a policy space, a policy vacuum, appears to 
exist for this policy issue. 
 It is likely that the same groups should not be responsible for producing and providing 
Spanish-language disaster information. FEMA/DHS has a much larger communication 
budget than do the state and county emergency management agencies as evidenced by the 
wide variety of high quality disaster information FEMA/DHS produces. The state emergency 
management communicators I interviewed, on the other hand, repeatedly mentioned that they 
do not have sufficient funds to produce all of the disaster information they would like to 
produce in any language. Likewise, the extremely small budgets that the county emergency 
management directors have for public communication in general, and Spanish-language 
communication in particular, also indicate that counties are not well equipped to produce 
English-language or Spanish-language disaster communication. Thus, the interview and 
survey findings indicate that FEMA/DHS, rather than the states and counties, should be 
responsible for producing Spanish-language disaster information unless the states and federal 
government are willing to provide the counties with larger communication budgets. However, 
since states and counties are connected to their local communities, states and counties, rather 
than FEMA/DHS, should be responsible for providing the Spanish-language information 
directly to the public. States and counties also should be responsible for adapting 
FEMA/DHS Spanish-language materials so that these materials better meet any unique needs 
of local communities.   
 Also, the states and counties should work more often with local volunteer organizations, 
especially religious and ethnic organizations, to provide Spanish-language disaster 
information to the public. Hispanics are more inclined to seek disaster information from 
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nongovernmental sources and are more likely to rely on social networks rather than the mass 
media for disaster information. Despite the important role local ethnic and religious 
organizations can play in helping government officials provide Spanish-language disaster 
information to the public, the interviews revealed that only a couple of the SEMA 
communicators work with local religious and ethnic organizations. Likewise, very few of the 
county emergency management directors work with local religious and ethnic organizations 
to provide Spanish-language disaster information. Thus, states and counties should reach out 
more to these groups. These groups also should take the initiative in reaching out to states 
and counties, especially given how understaffed and underfunded the state and county 
emergency management agencies are.  
 In addition, there needs to be some sort of monitoring system to ensure that the Spanish-
language information FEMA develops actually is distributed by the states and counties to the 
public. Such a monitoring system would mitigate the information-asymmetry that exists 
among the federal, state, and local governments. This monitoring system should not be 
punitive in nature but rather should establish channels through which open dialogue can 
occur. FEMA could sponsor national or regional conferences on how best to use their 
Spanish-language resources to communicate disaster information to Hispanics. At these same 
conferences, states and counties could provide examples of resources they have created to 
communicate disaster information to Hispanics. The states also could sponsor similar 
conferences that would foster information sharing across their state or among multiple states 
and counties.  
 On a more practical level, state emergency management agencies need to be better 
connected to their county emergency management directors. As I already mentioned, the vast 
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majority of the states in my sample had trouble finding the contact information for their 
county emergency management directors. Many of the states provided outdated addresses 
and phone numbers. Most of the states did not have the names of their county emergency 
management directors. If the states do not have updated and readily available contact 
information for their county emergency management directors it is obvious that they are not 
communicating very frequently with these directors. Thus, the state emergency management 
agencies need to be better connected with their counties in order to better provide the 
counties with Spanish-language information the states themselves develop. 
 Similarly, county emergency management directors and state emergency management 
communicators need to be better connected with government employees from other localities 
with the same responsibilities. Many of the SEMA communicators I interviewed mentioned 
they appreciate using materials other states already have developed. These same 
communicators, however, do not have the resources to identify which states produce 
materials they would like to use with permission. Since conducting the survey, more than 20 
county emergency management directors have contacted me to ask if I can connect them with 
others who may already produce the Spanish-language materials they would like to provide. 
Thus, it would be helpful if there were a guide identifying the individuals responsible for 
producing and providing Spanish-language materials in states and counties as well as in 
nongovernmental organizations. This guide could be initiated by FEMA online, and 
interested states and counties could voluntarily post their contact information as well as any 
Spanish-language materials they are willing to share.   
 On a theoretical level, this study provides evidence that public sector organizations face 
challenges when providing Spanish-language disaster information that may not be found in 
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the private sector. First, public sector organizations operate in a disaster system in which 
there is no clear channel for providing Spanish-language disaster information to the public. 
One of the reasons why there is no clear channel is that the system of federalism divides the 
responsibility for disaster communication among multiple governmental and 
nongovernmental organizations so that no so single organization possesses complete 
responsibility for disaster communication. This separation of responsibilities allows 
governmental and nongovernmental organizations to shirk their responsibility of providing 
Spanish-language disaster information by passing this responsibility on to some other group.  
 This study revealed that both states and counties are shirking and are likely to continue 
shirking until the intergovernmental system changes so that a few groups are identified as 
responsible for developing and providing Spanish-language disaster information. 
Unfortunately, such a change is not likely to transpire until a major disaster highlights the 
fact that no one is taking responsibility for providing Spanish-language disaster information. 
The last time such a major disaster occurred was in 1992 with Hurricane Andrew. After 
Andrew, governmental and nongovernmental organizations began providing Spanish-
language disaster information. More recently, 2005 Hurricane Katrina revealed that 
Mississippi and Louisiana were not prepared to communicate disaster information in Spanish. 
However, since these states have very small Hispanic populations, both less than 3% of the 
total state population, the lack of Spanish-language disaster information did not become a 
national issue after Katrina. Therefore, since no major disaster has occurred since 1992 to 
highlight the dearth of Spanish-language disaster information states and counties provide, 
states and counties have been able to continue shirking.   
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 In addition, public sector organizations are affected by the political ideology of their 
leaders. This ideology may affect whether public sector organizations provide Spanish-
language disaster information. Public sector officials will only be effective in communicating 
disaster information to Hispanics if they believe providing Spanish-language disaster 
information is the government’s responsibility. Initial evidence indicates that at least some of 
the county emergency management directors I surveyed do not believe the government is 
responsible for producing and providing Spanish-language disaster information. Five 
directors returned uncompleted surveys with comments that they did not believe the 
government is responsible for communicating disaster information in Spanish. For example, 
one director wrote on the survey, “This is the United States. English is spoken here. Mexico 
does not print information in two languages.” Another director wrote, “If Hispanics are going 
to live and work in the USA they should all learn to speak English.” 
 Eight of the directors who completed the telephone survey also mentioned that they 
thought Hispanics should learn English and the government is not responsible for 
communicating in Spanish during routine or disaster times. For example, one of these 
directors said, “This may not be politically correct, but I believe they [Hispanic immigrants] 
should learn English if they are going to live here.” Another director said, “I think they 
should go back to Mexico if they can’t learn English. I’m not responsible for providing 
disaster information in Spanish.” None of the state emergency management communicators I 
interviewed over the phone expressed similar statements, but this may because all of the 
interview participants were public relations practitioners, and thus trained not to make 
statements that could be perceived as politically incorrect. Also, the telephone survey 
respondents may have been more likely to mention their opinions on Hispanic immigrants 
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because I administered the telephone survey while Congress was debating immigration 
reform.   
 State and local government officials will take their cue from the federal government on 
how important it is to produce and provide Spanish-language disaster information. Currently, 
Congress is debating multiple proposals to reform how the country manages legal and illegal 
immigration. These proposals have the potential to radically alter how the country treats 
illegal immigrants, with the most drastic proposal making it a crime to provide government 
services to illegal immigrants. Depending upon the legislation that Congress passes, 
developing and providing Spanish-language disaster information may become even more 
important if more non-English speaking Hispanics are legally allowed to come to work in the 
United States. Or, if providing government services to illegal immigrants become a crime, 
government officials may feel justified in not providing Spanish-language disaster 
information. 
 On a pedagogical level, this study provides evidence that public relations educators may 
want to reconsider how they teach crisis communication and pubic relations writing. 
Government communicators responsible for disaster communication have to operate in a 
system where information is not easily shared among levels of government and where 
officials often shirk their responsibilities to produce and provide disaster information. 
Corporate communicators responsible for crisis communication likely do not face these same 
obstacles. Therefore, while teaching crisis communication, educators need to identify 
constraints and opportunities unique to both the public and private sectors, rather than 
treating crisis communication as the same for both sectors. Likewise, while teaching public 
relations writing, educators need to introduce cultural considerations that affect how various 
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publics respond to information. This study’s literature review highlighted that Hispanics’ 
media preferences are different from the preferences of both blacks and whites, and 
Hispanics respond differently to messages than do blacks and whites. Therefore, while 
teaching public relations writing, educators need to discuss these differences. Without 
knowing how diverse publics are likely to respond to various public relations vehicles, 
students are likely to take a one-size-fits all approach to public relations writing.  
 Like any public policy issue, the decision to produce and provide Spanish-language 
disaster information is based upon a set of complicated factors that vary among states and 
counties. This study provides evidence, however, that developing relationships with multiple 
governmental and nongovernmental groups helps counties provide Spanish-language disaster 
information. States and counties do not consistently work with these groups to provide 
Spanish-language disaster information, and states and counties identify different groups as 
primarily responsible for producing and providing Spanish-language disaster information. 
Thus, states and counties are inefficient in providing Spanish-language disaster information 
because there is no clear chain of responsibility for providing this information to the public. 
The groups with a stake in producing and providing Spanish-language disaster information 
need to better communicate with each other. Likewise, at least a few of these groups need to 
identify themselves as primarily responsible for producing and providing Spanish-language 
disaster information.  
 While the United States disaster system has some obvious flaws, as evidenced by the failed 
federal, state, and local responses to 2005 Hurricane Katrina (Liu, 2006a), the results from 
the interviews and survey reveal that this system is even more flawed for Spanish-speakers. 
Emergency managers at all levels of government must take responsibility for communicating 
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Spanish-language disaster information and learn how to better communicate with this 
important group. Regardless of the immigration legislation Congress passes, Hispanics will 
continue to be an important demographic group in the United States that emergency 
managers cannot ignore.
APPENDIX A: Interview guide 
Q1: Tell me a little about your background.
Q2: What are the major disasters or crises here state faces in a given year?
Q3: What are the primary methods you use to communicate disaster information to the public?
Probes:  Press releases 
 Fact sheets 
 Brochures 
 Disaster guides 
 Coloring books 
 Public service announcements 
 Video news releases 
 Community meetings 
 Web site 
 Bill boards 
 Magnets 
 
Q4: What type, if any, unique communication do you provide for special-needs populations?
Probes:  Hispanics 
 Other language minorities 
 Children 
 Elderly 
 Disabled 
 
Q5: Do you have a crisis communication plan?
Q6: After a disaster occurs do you evaluate of your communication efforts?
Q7: Tell me about how, if at all, you coordinate with other levels of government 
communicate disaster information to the public.
Q8: Tell me about how, if at all, you coordinate with non-governmental organizations to 
communicate disaster information to the public.
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APPENDIX B: Survey instrument 
 
How Counties Communicate Disaster Information to Hispanics 
 
Background: This survey should take no longer than 15 minutes to complete. All answers 
are confidential. All findings will be reported as aggregate data.  
 
For the purpose of this survey, a disaster:
• Involves the destruction of property, injury or loss of life; 
• Is relatively sudden and time-limited; 
• Adversely affects a relatively large group of people; 
• Is “public” and shared by members of more than one family; and 
• Is out of the realm of the ordinary experience. 
 
In the following questions, check all the types of disaster information that your county 
provides in English and/or Spanish. N/A indicates your county does not provide that type 
of information in English or Spanish.  
 
Information Type                     English         Spanish      N/A 
1. Brochures 
 
2. Disaster guides 
 
3. Radio & TV public service    
 announcements 
 
4. Newsletters 
 
5. News releases 
 
6. Magnets 
 
7. Activity books for children 
 
8. Community meetings 
 
9. Church groups or meetings 
 
10. Fact sheets 
 
11. Video news releases 
 
12. Print advertising 
 
13. Telephone hotlines 
 
14. Web page    
15. Billboards    
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16. Other information in English_________________________________(please specify) 
 
17. Other information in Spanish________________________________ (please specify) 
 
Who do you believe should be responsible for producing disaster information in 
Spanish? On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is low responsibility and 5 is high 
responsibility, check a single box. N/A indicates the question is not applicable to 
your county. 
 
1= low responsibility      5= high responsibility 
 N/A= not applicable 
 
1 2 3 4 5 N/A 
18. FEMA or DHS 
 
19. Your state emergency   
 management agency or  
 division 
 
20. Agencies or departments other  
 than emergency management  
 within your state 
 
21. Your state governor/governor’s 
office 
 
22. Employees from other county  
 emergency management   
 agencies within your state 
 
23. Agencies or departments other  
 than emergency management  
 within your county 
 
24.  City mayors within your  
 county/counties 
 
25. City emergency managers  
 within your state 
 
26. VOAD excluding local ethnic  
 and religious organizations 
 
27. Local ethnic organizations 
 
28. Local religious organizations 
 
29. Private sector organizations 
 
30. Other group (please specify) 
 
31. Other group (please specify) 
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How capable do you believe the following governmental and nongovernmental groups are 
of producing the highest quality disaster information for Hispanics? On a scale of 1 to 5, 
where 1 is low capability and 5 is high capability, check one box for each entity listed. N/A 
indicates the question is not applicable to your county.  
1= low capability             5= high capability 
 N/A= not applicable 
 
1 2 3 4 5 N/A 
32. FEMA or DHS 
 
33. Your state emergency   
 management agency or  
 division 
 
34. Agencies or departments other  
 than emergency management  
 within your state 
 
35. Your state governor/governor’s 
office 
 
36. Employees from other county  
 emergency management   
 agencies within your state 
 
37. Agencies or departments other  
 than emergency management  
 within your county 
 
38.  City mayors within your  
 county/counties 
 
39. City emergency managers  
 within your state 
 
40. VOAD excluding local ethnic  
 and religious organizations 
 
41. Local ethnic organizations 
 
42. Local religious organizations 
 
43. Private sector organizations 
 
44. Other group (please specify) 
 
45. Other group (please specify) 
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How often does your county work with the following governmental and nongovernmental 
groups to provide disaster information in Spanish? On a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 is not 
often and 5 is very often, check a single box in the grid on the left. N/A indicates the 
question is not applicable to your county.  
 
Do you work most with the following governmental and nongovernmental groups before, 
during, or after disasters? Check all that apply in the grid on the right for each entity listed.
1=not often                          5=very often     
 N/A=not applicable 
 
1 2 3 4 5 N/A  before during after 
46. FEMA or DHS 
 
47. Your state emergency   
 management agency or    
 division 
 
48. Agencies or departments other 
than emergency management  
 within your state 
 
49. Your state    
 governor/governor’s  
 office 
 
50. Your state legislators 
 
51. Employees from other county  
 emergency management   
 agencies within your state 
 
52. Agencies or departments other  
than emergency management  
 within your county 
 
53. City mayors within your  
 county/counties 
 
54. City emergency managers  
 within your state 
 
55. VOAD excluding local ethnic  
 And religious organizations 
 
56. Local ethnic organizations 
 
57. Local religious organizations 
 
58. Private sector organizations 
 
59. Other group (please  
 specify) 
 
60. Other group (please  
 specify) 
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The last set of questions asks for information about your county emergency management agency or 
division and your job. Please fill in the blanks or circle the categories that best match your answers. 
 
61.  How many emergency management employees and volunteers does your county emergency 
management agency or division have? 
________full-time employees ________part-time employees ________volunteers 
 
62. How many, if any, of your county emergency management employees and volunteers speak 
Spanish? 
 
_________county emergency management employees and volunteers who speak Spanish 
 
63. How many, if any, Spanish-speaking employees outside of county emergency management 
do you have access to for disaster planning, disaster response, and disaster recovery? 
 
________Spanish-speaking employees outside of emergency management for disaster planning 
________Spanish-speaking employees outside of emergency management for disaster response 
________Spanish-speaking employees outside of emergency management for disaster recovery   
 
64. How many disasters has the governor of you state declared in the past five years? 
 
________state disasters declared in past five years 
 
65. How many disasters has your county emergency management agency or division responded 
to in the past five years? 
 
________disasters county responded to in past five years 
 
66. How would you rate the level of financial support provided by the federal government for 
your county emergency management direct-to-the-public communication on a scale of 1 to 5, 
where 1 is low financial support and 5 is high financial support? 
 
1 2 3 4 5
low support                      high support 
 
67. How would you rate the level of financial support provided by your state government for 
your county emergency management direct-to-the-public communication on a scale of 1 to 5, 
where 1 is low financial support and 5 is high financial support? 
 
1 2 3 4 5
low support                       high support 
 
68. How would you rate the level of financial support provided by your county emergency 
management budget for direct-to-the-public communication on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is low 
financial support and 5 is high financial support? 
 
1 2 3 4 5
low support                      high support 
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69. What is your budget, excluding salaries, for developing, producing, and distributing disaster 
information? 
 
$________ 
 
70. Approximately what percentage of this budget is dedicated to developing, producing, and 
distributing Spanish-language disaster information? 
 
________% 
71. What is your ideal budget request for the effective development, production, and 
distribution of disaster information? 
$________ 
72. What percentage of your ideal budget request would be used for the effective development, 
production, and distribution of disaster information in Spanish? 
________% 
 
73. How many years have you been in your current position? 
 
________years in current position 
 
74. How many years have you been employed in emergency management? 
 
________years employed in emergency management 
 
75. In addition to county emergency management, please circle other responsibilities you have. 
Circle N/A (choice 7) if you only work for county emergency management.  
 
1.  Fire department/inspection/marshal                             5.  Emergency medical services/hospitals                                   
2.  Law enforcement                                                          6.  Corrections   
3.  Communications/911 dispatch                                     7. N/A 
4.   County judicial                                                                                                   
8.  Other__________________________________________________________ (please specify) 
 
76.  Are you a part-time or full-time employee in your current position? 
 
1.  part-time  2.  full-time 
 
77.  In which state is your county located? 
 
_______________state in which your county is located 
 
78.  In which county is your emergency management agency/division located? 
 
___________________________________________county  
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APPENDIX C: IAEM endorsement letter 
 
January 15, 2006 
 
Dear Colleague: 
 
I would like to encourage you to take the time to complete University of 
North Carolina’s survey on county disaster communication for Hispanics.  
 
This research is very important. The results will be highly instrumental in helping emergency 
managers at all levels of government better communicate disaster information to Hispanics. 
Please take the time to complete the survey and look for a summary of the results in a future 
issue of the IAEM Bulletin.
Best regards. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Elizabeth B. Armstrong, MAM, CAE 
IAEM Executive Director 
201 Park Washington Court 
Falls Church, VA 
22046-4527 USA 
Ph. 703-538-1795 
Fax 703-241-5603 
E-mail iaem.com 
www.iaem.com
www.EMEX.org
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APPENDIX D: Survey pre-notice letter 
 
THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA 
AT 
CHAPEL HILL 
 
Brooke Fisher Liu, Ph.D. Candidate                                                         School of Journalism and Mass Communication 
Roy H. Park Fellow and Page Legacy Scholar                                                                                   CB 3365 Carroll Hall 
Voice: (919) 593-2388                                                                                                            Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3365 
Fax: (919) 962-0620                                                                                                                           E-mail: bliu@unc.edu 
 
How Counties Communicate Disaster Information to Hispanics 
 
January 31, 2006 
 
Dear Colleague: 
 
Hurricane Katrina recently reminded us that the emergency management system doesn’t always 
effectively communicate with minorities.  
 
A researcher at the University of North Carolina in collaboration with the International Association of 
Emergency Managers is conducting a study to examine how counties communicate disaster 
information to Hispanics. You were selected to participate in this research study because you are a 
county emergency management director/coordinator in a state with a very large and/or rapidly 
growing Hispanic population. You are one of approximately 1,500 county emergency management 
directors/coordinators who have been invited to voluntarily participate in this study.  
 
In a few days, you will receive a survey asking about how your county communicates disaster 
information to Hispanics and/or works with other organizations to provide disaster information for 
Hispanics. If your county currently does not communicate disaster information to Hispanics your 
feedback still is very valuable. Completion of the survey should take no longer than 15 minutes. 
 
You may contact the principal investigator, Brooke Liu, with any questions at (919) 593-2388 or by 
email (bliu@unc.edu). 
 
All research on human volunteers is reviewed by a committee that works to protect your rights and 
welfare. If you have questions or concerns about your rights as a research subject you may contact, 
anonymously if you wish, the Institutional Review Board at 919-966-3113 or by email to 
IRB_subjects@unc.edu. 
 
I hope you will participate in this study to shape recommendations for communicating disaster 
information to Hispanics. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Brooke Liu 
Page Legacy Scholar and Roy H. Park Fellow 
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APPENDIX E: Survey cover letter 
 
THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA 
AT 
CHAPEL HILL 
 
Brooke Fisher Liu, Ph.D. Candidate                                                         School of Journalism and Mass Communication 
Roy H. Park Fellow and Page Legacy Scholar                                                                         CB 3365 Carroll Hall 
Voice: (919) 593-2388                                                                                                            Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3365 
Fax: (919) 962-0620                                                                                                                           E-mail: bliu@unc.edu 
 
How Counties Communicate Disaster Information to Hispanics 
 
February 7, 2006 
 
Dear Colleague: 
 
A University of North Carolina researcher in collaboration with the International Emergency 
Managers Association is conducting a study to examine how counties communicate disaster 
information to Hispanics.  
 
You were selected to participate in this study because you are the county emergency management 
director/coordinator in a state with a very large and/or rapidly growing Hispanic population. If you 
think you are not the best person to complete this survey, please pass it along to some one else within 
your county jurisdiction who could better respond.
To participate in the study you would complete the enclosed questionnaire and return it in the 
enclosed postage paid envelope. If you prefer to complete the survey online, send an email to 
bliu@unc.edu. Returning your completed questionnaire or completing the survey online connotes 
your consent to be a participant in this study.  
 
The survey includes questions about how your county communicates disaster information to 
Hispanics and/or works with other organizations to provide this information. If your county currently 
does not communicate disaster information to Hispanics your feedback still is very valuable. It should 
take no longer than 15 minutes to complete the survey. You are free to answer or not answer any 
particular question.  
 
Your participation is confidential. The only person who will have access to these data is the 
investigator named on this letter. All findings will be reported as aggregate data. If you would like to 
receive an executive summary of the survey results, please send an email to bliu@unc.edu or call 
Brooke Liu at 919-593-2388. 
 
There are neither risks anticipated should you participate in this study nor any anticipated personal 
benefits from being involved with it. There is no cost to you or financial benefit for your participation. 
To receive an executive summary of the results, or if you have any questions, please contact the 
investigator identified in this letter. 
 
All research on human volunteers is reviewed by a committee that works to protect your rights and 
welfare. If you have questions or concerns about your rights as a research subject you may contact, 
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anonymously if you wish, the Institutional Review Board at 919-966-3113 or by email to 
IRB_subjects@unc.edu. 
 
Thank you for considering participation in this study. I hope I can use your response to help shape 
recommendations for communicating disaster information to Hispanics. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Brooke Liu 
 
P.S. Please consider enclosing any materials you use (e.g., brochures, fact sheets, etc.) to 
communicate disaster information to Hispanics with your survey response in the pre-paid envelope. 
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APPENDIX F: Survey postcard 
 
How Counties Communicate Disaster Information to Hispanics 
 
February 10, 2006 
 
Dear Colleague: 
 
You recently received a survey sponsored by the International Emergency Managers 
Association and UNC-Chapel Hill about how counties communicate disaster information to 
Hispanics.  
 
If you already have completed the survey, thank you very much for your feedback! 
 
If you have not completed the survey, I urge you to do so soon. You can request an online 
version of the survey by sending an email to bliu@unc.edu 
 
Please note participation in this study is completely voluntary. I would, however, greatly 
appreciate your help in shaping recommendations on how to communicate disaster 
information to Hispanics. If you have any questions, please contact bliu@unc.edu or call 
Brooke Liu at 919-593-2388. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Brooke Liu 
Page Legacy Scholar and Roy H. Park Fellow 
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Appendix G: Survey Replacement cover letter 
THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA 
AT 
CHAPEL HILL 
 
Brooke Fisher Liu, Ph.D. Candidate                                                         School of Journalism and Mass Communication 
Roy H. Park Fellow and Page Legacy Scholar                                                                                CB 3365 Carroll Hall 
Voice: (919) 593-2388                                                                                                            Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3365 
Fax: (919) 962-0620                                                                                                                           E-mail: bliu@unc.edu 
 
How Counties Communicate Disaster Information to Hispanics 
 
February 27, 2006 
 
Dear Colleague: 
 
A few weeks ago you received a survey sponsored by the International Emergency Managers 
Association about how counties communicate disaster information to Hispanics. I recognize you are 
very busy, but greatly would appreciate your feedback on this important policy issue.   
 
If your county currently does not communicate disaster information to Hispanics your feedback still 
is very valuable. Completion of the questionnaire should take no longer than 15 minutes. You are 
free to answer or not answer any particular question.  
 
You were selected to participate in this study because you are the county emergency management 
director/coordinator in a state with a very large and/or rapidly growing Hispanic population. If you 
think you are not the best person to complete this survey, please pass it along to some one else within 
your county jurisdiction who could better respond.
To participate in the study you would complete the enclosed questionnaire and return it in the 
enclosed postage paid envelope. If you prefer to complete the survey online, send an email to 
bliu@unc.edu. Returning your completed questionnaire or completing the survey online connotes 
your consent to be a participant in this study.  
 
The survey includes questions about how your county communicates disaster information to 
Hispanics and/or works with other organizations to provide this information.  
 
If you have any questions about the survey, please contact the investigator identified in this letter. If 
you have questions or concerns about your rights as a research subject you may contact the 
Institutional Review Board at 919-966-3113 or by email to IRB_subjects@unc.edu. 
 
Thank you for considering participation in this study. I hope I can use your response to help shape 
recommendations for communicating disaster information to Hispanics. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Brooke Liu 
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